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I. INTRODUCTION
The Palestinian' uprising known as the intifada is now in its fifth year.
t Associate Professor of Law, University ofIowa College of Law. J.D. 1982 Stanford; M.A. 1979
UCLA; A.B. 1978 Princeton. I would like to thank the following people for reviewing earlier drafts
of this article: Professors Bums Weston, George Bisharat, Mary Dudziak, Lakshman Guruswamy, Joost
Hiltermann, Herbert Hovenkamp, Ken Kress, Mark Linder, John Quigley, John Reitz, Peter Shane,
Gregory Williams, as well as Jonathan Kuttab, Melissa Phillips, Hadla Ayoubi, Rebecca Faery, Victor
Arango, Makbool Javaid, and Cameron Stracher. Research assistance was provided by students Beverly
Blake, Douglas Burrell, Vanita Cheung, Shea Doyle, Craig Harada, Lonnie Johnson, John Lee, Sylke
Merchan, and Jamil Shawwa. A special thanks to my sources in the Occupied Territories.
1. Today there are more than five million Palestinians worldwide. Approximately 840,000 are
citizens of Israel, living inside its pre-1967 borders along with 4.2 million Jews. YEDIOTH AHRONOTH,
Sept. 25, 1992, at 1. For a discussion of Palestinian Israelis, see, e.g., Nadim Rouhana, The Intifada
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Intifada,2 from the Arabic verb "to shake," connotes an attempt to shake off
twenty-five years of Israeli occupation.3 During the intifada considerable
world attention has focused on the image of keffiyah4-clad youth who throw
stones in the Occupied Territories (the West Bank and Gaza).5 Due to this
focus, some commentators have characterized the intifada as an uncoordinated
reign of terror on a hapless population.' Others, including this author, see
rather the beginnings of de facto Palestinian autonomy and embryonic self-
rule.7
Whereas many authors have focused on the intifada's manifold social,
economic, political, or human rights issues,8 this article explores another
aspect of the intifada: legal decision-making and the process of attempted self-
rule.9 It postulates that the Palestinians are developing embryonic elements
and the Palestinians of Israel: Resurrecting the Green Line, I. PALESTINE STUD., Spring 1990, at 58.
About 960,000 Palestinians live in the West Bank, including 125,000 in occupied East Jerusalem. Lisa
Hajiar et al., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Beginners, in INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN
UPRISING AGAINST ISRAELI OCCUPATION 101, 105 (Zachary Lockman & Joel Beinin eds., 1989)
[hereinafter INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING]. The Gaza Strip had a 1989 population of 612,000.
THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK: STATISTICAL AND HISTORICAL ANNUAL OF THE STATES OF THE WORLD
FOR THE YEAR 1992-1993 at 809 (Brian Hunter ed., 1992).
2. There are often several common English transliterations for the same Arabic word (e.g. intifuda,
intifadah and intifadeh). I have chosen spellings for Arabic words based on frequency of usage in the
literature.
3. This article will not address justifications for the intifuda. See, e.g., Richard Falk & Bums
Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Palestinian Rights in the West Bank & Gaza: In Legal
Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J. 129 (1991) (arguing that Israeli occupation of West Bank
and Gaza challenges international law, violates traditional human rights policies, and thus justifies
Palestinian resistance); The Intifadah -An Act ofSelfDefence, 4 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 85 (1987-88)
(justifying Palestinian revolt against Israeli administration of Occupied Territories).
4. A keffiyah is the traditional Palestinian white and black or red checkered headscarf.
5. This article refers to this area as either the West Bank, Gaza, or the Occupied Territories. The
former Likud party Israeli government referred to the West Bank by its biblical names of Judea and
Samaria. The current government calls the West Bank and Gaza the Administered Territories. Although
this article concerns both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, it will primarily discuss the West Bank due
to the dearth of information on Gaza. On Palestinians in Gaza see generally Sara Roy, The Political
Economy ofDespair: Changing PoliticalAttitudes Among Gaza Refugees, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn
1989, at 58, 72; Ann Mosely Lesch, Gaza: History and Politics, in ISRAEL, EGYPT AND THE
PALESTINIANS: FROM CAMP DAVID TO INiFADA 223 (Ann Mosely Lesch & Mark Tessler eds., 1989)
[hereinafter CAMP DAVID].
6. See F. ROBERT HUNTER, THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING: A WAR BY OTHER MEANS 124-25
(1991).
7. See, e.g., Ehud Ya'ari, Inifading: The PLO's Revolt Peters Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 11,
1991, at 16.
8. See generally CAMW DAVID, supra note 5; HUNTER, supra note 6; INTIFADA: PALESTINE AT THE
CROSSROADS 91 (Jamal R. Nassar & Roger Heacock eds., 1990) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]; INTIFADA:
THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1; NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW AND ISRAELI EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING (1989) [hereinafter NLG];
ZE'EV SCHIFF & EHUD YA'ARI, INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING-ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT (Ina
Friedman ed. & trans., 1990) [hereinafter ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT].
9. The information conveyed in this article covers primarily the period prior to the Gulf War crisis.
Source material includes interviews conducted by the first joint delegation of the National Conference
of Black Lawyers of the United States of America (NCBL) and the Society of Black Lawyers of
England and Wales, which visited the Occupied Territories (as well as Israel and Cairo) from December
22, 1989 through January 9, 1990 to assess the legal and judicial mechanisms developed by the
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of a new legal regime"° under severe constraints." The article describes and
evaluates the nascent process in which various legal actors are creating new
executive, legislative, and judicial institutions and procedures to formulate and
implement new rules of decision. Examination of this embryonic decision-
making process illustrates the extent to which the intifada has contributed to
both change and continuity within Palestinian legal culture.
Palestinian society during the intifada is representative of the many
societies in which the dominant legal power has little legitimacy among a
significant sector of the population, 2 or is viewed as inadequate or unrespon-
sive to a sub-community's legal needs. 3 Far from being merely a disorga-
Palestinian people during the intifada. The delegation consisted of myself and three other individuals:
Mr. Makbool Javaid, a Muslim solicitor who was the secretary and executive committee member of the
Society; Mr. Manjit Gill, barrister and executive committee member of the Society; and Mr. Victor
Arango, executive editor of The Human Condition, a U.S.-based newspaper. For discussion of our trip,
see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BLACK LAWYERS, REPORT OF A JOINT DELEGATION OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BLACK LAWYERS, USA AND THE SOCIETY OF BLACK LAWYERS OF ENGLAND AND
WALES (1990) (on file with author); Victor Arango, Control or Chaos? Israel in the Occupied
Territories, THE HUMAN CONDITION, Mar. 1990, at 1.
Participation in the intfada leadership subjects one to immediate arrest and imprisonment, and it
is therefore not possible to name sources. Suffice it to say that the four researchers talked with and
recorded the observations of nearly 100 people, male and female, including prominent lawyers,
community activists, journalists, political leaders, labor leaders, union members, teachers, students,
elders, and others to derive some of the information cited herein. Many of these individuals had been
incarcerated for their alleged political activities. We were told by various informants that our sources
were representative of the various political factions of the PLO in the Unified National Leadership of
the Uprising (UNLU). Although this inability openly to name individuals makes it difficult to verify the
data provided by interviewees independently, it cannot be avoided. The research was complicated
further by the fact that we do not speak Arabic, and thus had to communicate with some informants via
translator.
In an attempt to address problems of verification, the author conducted a survey of written
literature in English and an Arabic-speaking research assistant conducted a similar survey of material
in Arabic. Surveying data is also problematic because all media sources in the Occupied Territories are
censored. See ANDREW RIGBY, LIVING THE INTIFADA 140 (1991). The article indicates where the only
sources available are personal interviews. Otherwise, citations are to published sources only. For a
discussion of research problems encountered by another author see HUNTER, supra note 6, at xviii.
10. A legal system may be defined as a set of institutions, procedures, and rules. See JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIi LAW TRADITION 1 (1969) ("A legal system is... an operating set of legal
institutions, procedures and rules"; distinguishes between legal system and legal tradition); John Henry
Merryman, The Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common Law, in NEw
PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 222 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1978) (defining "legal
system" as comprised of "legal extension, legal penetration, legal culture, legal structures, legal actors,
and legal processes").
11. Because the regime is in its earliest stages and because the occupation constrains the free flow
of information, the level of available detail is often far less than would be desirable. What follows at
times reflects this.
12. See, e.g., Sandra Burman & Wilfried Scharf, Creating People's Justice: Street Committees and
the Uprising, 24 LAW & Soc'y REv. 693 (1990).
13. For a response to a similar problem in another society, see, BENEDICT ALPER & LAURENCE
NICHOLS, BEYOND THE COURTROOM: PROGRAMS IN COMMUNITY JUSTICE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
197-210 (1981) (describing informal tribunals). Additionally, the Palestinian legal experience can be
compared and contrasted with other societies which do not have independence. See e.g. ALBiE SACHS
& GrrA HANWANA WELCH, LmERATING THE LAW: CREATING POPULAR JUSTICE (1990) (discussing
Mozambique before and after independence). It can also be grouped with societies involved in national
liberation movements or societies with other revolutionary aims. SACHS & WELCH, supra; ALPER &
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nized uprising, te intifada represents in part one such community's attempt
to change its situation and create more acceptable legal institutions and
traditions. The sui generis transformations taling place in the intifada are built
upon selected elements of pre-existing legal institutions, rules, and procedures,
as well as new concepts of justice and authority identified by the community.
This article illustrates both how legal change reflects community values, and
how law can be used to change these values without sacrificing legitimacy or
effective enforcement; 4 specific examples include how the desires of women
and the young for a greater say in their own fates interact with conservative
community values. This article also explores the effect that social disruption
can have on the type of justice dispensed. The article concludes that the
emergence of embryonic underground autonomous legal structures is an
indication that the Palestinian people are developing, both deliberately and
inadvertently, an alternative power base15 which they hope may one day lead
to true independence. 16
One significant aspect of this embryonic regime is the extent to which
Palestinians obey new rules and whether compliance stems from the
rulemakers' legitimacy in Palestinian eyes or from coercive tactics. As such,
the Palestinian experience during the intifada is an important case study of the
role of coercion and legitimacy in the formation and duration of new legal
institutions. Given this concern, part H discusses the roles of legitimacy and
coercion in greater detail.
Since law is a function of historical circumstances,17 part III discusses the
pre-existing legal traditions utilized and rejected by the Palestinians." Part
NICHOLS, supra at 211-276 (containing examples from Cuba, China, the former Soviet Union and East
Germany). The Palestinian experience also contributes to the literature concerning societies with
multiple legal systems in operation. JOHN BARTON ET AL., LAW IN RADICALLY DIFUERENT CuLTURES
40 (1983) (discussing Botswana).
14. Burman & Scharf, supra note 12, at 694 (illustrating same in context of South Africa;
discussing possible evolution of informal systems of justice in rural South Africa into more
institutionalized system).
15. Salim Tamari, The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising,
J. PALE TINE STUD., Winter 1991, at 57, 69.
16. The 19th Session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian parliament in exile,
declared the existence of the State of Palestine on November 15, 1988. See Declaration of
Independence, U.N. Doc. A/43/827,S/20278, Annex III at 15 (1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1668,
1670 (1988); see also James L. Prince, International Legal Implications of the November 1988
Palestinian Declaration of Statehood, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 681 (1989); Youssef Ibrahim, PLO
Proclaims Palestine to be an Independent State, N.Y. TIMes, Nov. 15, 1988 at Al, ol. 6. Under
international law, a state has a defined territory, a permanent population under control of its own
government, and engages in formal relations with other entities. REsTATmmENT (THRD) OF FOREION
RELATIONS § 201 (1987). The General Assembly acknowledged the Declaration and changed the U.N.
designation from PLO to Palestine, but the General Assembly could not formally recognize the state
because it did not meet the above requirements.
17. June Starr & Jane F. Collier, Introduction: Dialogues in LegalAnthropology, in HISTORY AND
POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW 24 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) (law is historical product,
arising from particular historical negotiations between and among groups).
18. See Norman Bentwich, The Legal System of Palestine Under the Mandate, 2 MiDDLE E. J. 33,
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IV examines the decision-makers themselves, noting the educational, gender,
age, and class characteristics of the people developing the institutions,
processes, and rules. Part V explores the institutions created during the
intifada which perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions, including
the underground Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), 9 the
National Reconciliation Committee (NRC), and the justice committees. Part
VI discusses dispute resolution procedures, particularly mediation proceed-
ings. Part VII looks at selected new rules2" that have emerged in the areas
of landlord/tenant relations, labor relations, women's rights, and penalties.
Although most of the material in this article describes the period prior to
the Gulf Crisis, Part VIII focuses on the intifada during and after the Gulf
Crisis.2 Significant changes occurred during this time which have under-
mined many of the positive steps taken in the earlier years of the intifada
toward creating a new legal regime. The article concludes with a brief look
at the major obstacles that obstruct the fuller development of Palestinian legal
decision-making.
33 (1948) (describing Palestine's legal system as "mosaic"). Israel also has multiple legal subsystems
with Jewish, Ottoman, and British legal elements predating the Israeli civil law. See, e.g., Nahum
Rakover, Jewish Elements in Israeli Legislation, in LAW IN MULTICULTURAL SociErms 35, 36 (E.I.
Cuomo ed., 1989); Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom in a Religious State: The Case of Israel in
Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9 WISC. INT'L L.J. 1, 16-18 (1990).
19. Some have referred to the UNLU as the Unified National Command (UNC). See, e.g. THE
INTIFADA: ITS IMPACT ON ISRAEL, THE ARAB WORLD, & THE SUPERPowERs 72 (Robert Freedman ed.,
1991) (employing Arabic term al-Qiyada al Muwahhada).
20. Yale University anthropologist Leopold Pospfgil broadly defines law to include any rule
meeting the following criteria: authority, intention of universal application, obligation, and sanction.
LEOPOLD PosP&L, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAw 39-96 (1971). Phillippe Nonet and Philip Selznick also
define law broadly. PHa.IPPE NONEr & PHLIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 11
(1978); PHILU' SELZNICK, LAW, SOcmTY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 4 (1979).
21. Although there are several ways to classify the various stages of the uprising, I consider the
infada to have had four stages. The uprising started spontaneously on December 9, 1987, when four
Palestinians were killed by an Israeli truck that collided with two vans of Palestinians returning to the
Gaza Strip from work in Israel. Four thousand people attended the funeral, and protests and street
demonstrations spread throughout the territories. By January 1988 the second phase began as the
movement became organized and Palestinians began disengaging from the structures of the occupation
by boycotting the Israeli economy and establishing independent economic ventures. See generally
RICHARD T. DRURY & ROBERT C. WINN, PLOWSHARES AND SWORDS: THE ECONOMICS OF
OCCUPATION IN THE WEST BANK (1992); ECHOES OF THE INTIFADA: REGIONAL REPERCUSSIONS OF
THE PALESTINIAN-IsRAELI CONFLICT (Rex Brynen ed., 1991); JERUSALEM MEDIA & COMMUNICATION
CENTER, THE INTiFADA: AN OVERVIEW - THE FIRST 2 YEARS (1989) [hereinafter JMCC]; NLG,
supra note 8; ISRAEL'S THmD FRONT, supra note 8, at 17. This phase, which represented the height
of the intifada, lasted until July 1990, the start of the Gulf War Crisis. Phase three consisted of the
period leading up to and including the Gulf War, a time characterized by a deterioration in the ability
of the intfada leadership to implement its directives. Phase four, the current period, began after the end
of the Gulf War and is characterized by a severe loss of order despite the start of international peace
talks. See infra notes 331-380 and accompanying text.
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II. LEGITIMACY AND COERCION
Coercion and legitimacy each play a significant role in the evolving legal
process in the Occupied Territories, motivating Palestinians to obey some of
the rules and to seek out some of the dispute resolution mechanisms
promulgated by local decision-makers.' Coercive tactics have been well
documented by the media. For example, masked shabab (youths) have forced
merchants to keep their shops closed on strike days called by the leader-
ship.' Others have attacked the property of recalcitrant officials, and made
an attempt on the life of one mayor, Hasan E1-Tawil of El-Bireh.24 The
Israeli-appointed head of the Gaza Strip Bureij refugee camp resigned after his
car was torched and his home fire-bombed. Incidents such as these play a
role in securing obedience not only from those targeted, but from the broader
community as well. Furthermore, the Palestinians employ subtler forms of
coercion than violence or threats of violence. In a relatively intimate
community, social disapproval encourages cooperation; Palestinians who wish
to be regarded as honorable members of the community are likely to obey the
decisions of respected local leaders.26
Legitimacy and illegitimacy also play important roles. This article uses the
term legitimacy in a sociological sense: legitimacy denotes a situation in which
people accept authority without coercion on the basis of their belief that the
authority and its processes are valid.27 The new Palestinian legal regime is
emerging in large part because the legal system administered by Israel never
achieved legitimacy with the Palestinian community.2" "Unlike classic
colonialist regimes" which were able to ally themselves with the local elite
22. This observation is consistent with contemporary legal theory, which recognizes two
motivations for obedience: coercion and legitimacy. As Thomas Franck notes, "[m]ost contemporary
legal philosophers deem coercive power necessary but insufficient to secure habitual social assent to
governance." THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONs 15 (1990). Antonio
Gramsci identifies two types of political control: domination (coercion) and direction or hegemonic
control (exercise of control through generation of popular consent). CARL BOcs, GRAMscI's MARXISM
38 (1976).
23. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 21.
24. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 125; RIGBY, supra note 9, at 21.
25. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 21.
26. See CATHIE J. WITTY, MEDIATION AND SOCIETY: CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON
6 (1991).
27. Many theorists believe that legitimacy is the major noncoercive factor in eliciting obedience.
See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 22, at 15; 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Gunther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1968). But cf. Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Lmv,
1983 Wis. L. REv. 379 (advocating abandonment of concept of legitimacy in favor of investigation of
rational grounds for action). This concept, which constitutional theorists sometimes call perceived
legitimacy, is not the philosopher's concept of moral legitimacy. On moral legitimacy, see, e.g., David
Hume, On the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL & LITERARY 465 (Eugene Miller ed.,
1985); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1989).
28. GEORGE E. BISHARAT, PALFTNiAN LAWYERS AND IsRAELI RULE: LAW AND DISORDER IN
THE WE ST BANK 16 (1989).
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(property owners, merchants, and professionals), "the Israeli Occupation has
failed to win the sympathy or support of any meaningful sector of the
occupied population."' 9 By contrast, the Palestinians have embraced their
emerging legal system as legitimate." This legitimacy derives from the
Palestinian nationalism which has developed over two and a half decades of
occupation and has further intensified during the intifada. Nationalism has
encouraged people to demand a Palestinian-run alternative to Israeli
institutions, including a legal system.3' The ultimate goal of the embryonic
Palestinian institutions is to supplant the Israeli-administered legal regime, a
goal that coincides with the intifada's overall aims of developing autonomous
governmental structures in such areas as economic development, health,
agriculture, defense, and education.
Although Israel can use the coercive powers of the state to enforce its
edicts, many of its edicts have failed because the Palestinian population
regards neither the orders nor the governing authority as legitimate. However,
the Palestinian community deems most intifada rules legitimate because it
accepts both the rule-making process and the "governing" authority of the
UNLU,32 despite the fact that the UNLU is an unelected body. Western
critics might dispute the legitimacy of rules promulgated by an unelected
body. However, some Palestinians do not believe that elections are a
necessary component of legitimacy, because their traditions confer legitimacy
29. Ziad Abu-Amr, The Palestinian Uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 10 ARAB STUD.
Q. 384, 386 (1988).
30. One example of the degree to which the Palestinians accept and therefore legitimize the new
system is a blood feud between two families in Halhoul, a town in the West Bank, that customary law
mediation had been unable to resolve for twenty years. During September 1989, the disputants met with
representatives of the intifada leadership who, because they had the respect of the parties due to their
role in the intifada, were able to work out a satisfactory solution. The decision was published in the
local papers. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, local West Bank lawyers, in Jerusalem (Dec. 27, 1989);
Interview with M, an Israeli Palestinian, in Jerusalem (Dec. 26, 1989); Interview with J, a Palestinian
lawyer, in Chicago, Ill. (Aug. 7, 1990) (transcripts of all interviews on file with author). A second
example is the UNLU's call in April 1989 for conversion to daylight savings time two weeks before
the Israeli date of May 1st. Despite the breaking of Palestinian watches and wrists by Israeli forces, the
West Bank went to, and stayed on, Palestinian time. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, On Achieving Independence,
in CRossRoADs, supra note 8, at 10.
31. See Starr & Collier, supra note 17, at 10. "The PLO, with the fewest tangible resources and
the least effective power, is far away the most legitimate force in the region." BISHARAT, supra note
28, at 16, 181 n.26 (citing studies and polls). See generally HELENA COBBAN, THE PALESTINE
LmERATION ORGANIZATION: PEOPLE, POWER, AND PoLrics (1984). "The intrusion of tendrils of
external control" from Israel, the PLO, and formerly Jordan, "leaves the local community with limited
autonomy of its own and deprives its institutions of social control (such as police and courts) of most
of their capacity to regulate affairs according to locally defined needs and interests. The result is a
bizarre combination of immediate intervention and smothering control in matters that implicate the
interests of the three external authorities ('overcontrol') coupled, at times, with a breakdown of the
system of social accountability and virtual anarchy in realms in which only or primarily community
interests are at stake." BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 16.
32. Since many Palestinians identify with one of the four political factions in the UNLU, the
legitimacy which they bestow upon their faction carries over to the entire UNLU as well. HUNTER,
supra note 6, at 76.
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on those with social status due to inheritance or seniority. Others understand
that democratic elections are not possible in the current political climate. In
fact, municipal elections were last held in 1976, and Israel subsequently
removed many elected Palestinian officials from office.33 For the Palestin-
ians, one of the major goals of the intifada is an independent state in which
they would be able to elect their leaders."4 Free and fair elections would
bolster the legitimacy of the law-making process in the eyes of the local and
world communities. Should the Palestinians achieve this goal, the election of
leaders will alter traditional notions of legitimacy that stem from social status.
III. LEGAL TRADITIONS
Legal decision-making during the intiftda has been influenced by a variety
of pre-existing legal systems and traditions. 5 For example, parts of custom-
ary, Islamic, Egyptian civil, and Jordanian civil law have had great influence
on Palestinian decision-makers. By contrast, Ottoman law, Mandate law,
Israeli military law, and Israeli civil law have been largely rejected by
Palestinians, either as a symbolic estrangement from the Israeli administered
legal order,36 or because the laws promulgated under those systems have
been used to compromise Palestinian rights. This section briefly introduces
these pre-existing legal systems in the order in which they became relevant to
the Palestinians.
A. Customary Law
The oldest and most influential tradition still in partial usage today in the
Occupied Territories is the customary law (ur). 37 In the eyes of many
33. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 7.
34. Id. at 18.
35. According to Professors Merryman and Clark:
A legal tradition, as the term implies, is not a set of rules of law about contracts,
corporations, and crimes, although such rules will almost always be in some sense a reflection
of that tradition. Rather it is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about the
nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about the proper
organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law is or should be made,
applied, studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the legal system to the
culture of which it is a partial expression. It puts the legal system into cultural perspective.
MERRYMAN, supra note 10, at 3.
36. Starr & Collier, supra note 17, at 13 (describing Palestinian refusal to participate in legal
activities as symbolic estrangement from Israeli legal order).
37. The term "customary law" is used in modem anthropological literature in a very vague and
often meaningless way, connoting any type of non-legislative law in a tribal society. Pospl§EL, supra
note 20, at 194. See, e.g., KARL LLmwELYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941)
(discussing customary law among Cheyenne). The term "customary law" must be used with caution;
the implementation of something called customary law in the developing world has often been
rationalized as based on time-honored tradition, but in reality, much "customary law" is merely a
product of, and reaction to, the colonial experience. See, e.g., BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 191 n.35.
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Palestinians, customary law remains a viable, legitimate tradition which can
and should influence modern legal developments; thus, the intifada's decision-
makers draw extensively from this source.3" Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza have used urf to handle disputes outside of the official civil and
religious courts on the basis of traditional customs and norms that stress
conciliation, mediation, and family and group honor within the community.39
Historically, respected elders or reconciliation committees (lujnat el-islah)"
adjudicated and administered urf. Clans (hamayil) were often parties in
adjudicatory proceedings since "an offense against any individual, male or
female, [was] also seen as an offense against his or her family or clan.''
The types of disputes handled included contract matters between businessmen,
feuds between large extended families (often including payments of diya, or
blood money), trespass and other land matters, andpersonal injury.42
One traditional use of reconciliation committees was to mediate murder
cases. Customarily, a murder "trigger[ed] a period in which members of the
aggrieved's family [might] justifiably take vengeance against any-member of
the offender's family."43 To forestall this, neutral men" mobilized elders,
notables, or makhateer45 to act as temporary mediators to obtain a three-day
This section focuses on the customary law of dispute resolution, which is indeed a non-legislative, non-
governmental legal process.
38. According to Robert Hunter, "[t]hroughout the intfada the Palestinian Press [has] featured
articles on the return to customary law." HUNTER, supra note 6, at 3.
39. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 37.
40. Id. at 32, 187 n.5 (citing "a plethora of anthropological studies that document the venerated
status of mediators, often religiously sanctioned, in Middle Eastern societies"); see also ABNER COHEN,
ARAB BORDER-VLLAGES IN ISRAEL 82 (1965) (referring to existence of committees of reconciliation).
41. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 37. The Hamayil is a patrilineal descent group of males related
to the fifth degree through a common ancestor. ROSEMARY SAYIGH, PALESTINIANS: FROM PEASANTS
TO REVOLUTIONARIES 192 (1979).
42. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 41. Diya or blood money is an amount paid to the victim of a
personal injury and/or his family by the perpetrator and/or his family. Id. at 40; see also PHILIP J.
BALDENSPERGER, THE IMMOVABLE EAST: STUDIES OF THE PEOPLE AND CUSTOMS OF PALESTINE 115
(1913) (providing early account of blood dispute).
43. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 37.
44. Traditionally, only men were selected to perform such adjudicatory tasks. See id. at 40.
45. A mukhtar (pl. makhateer) is a village official who, since the Ottoman era, serves as a liaison
between families, and between clans and state authority in order to help maintain order and security in
the village. In the Jordanian era, makhateer were nominated by the hamula (clan) and confirmed by the
Jordanian district commissioner. Although a mukhtar is not a judicial officer, there are recorded
instances in which a mukhtar served as an arbitrator of disputes (e.g. the mukhtar of Dura settled a land
dispute in 1963). In 1954, the mukhtar of Halhoul mediated a land dispute between the villages of
Khirbet Jala and Bayt Umar. Id. at 54. Israeli Military Order No. 366, described id. at 196 n.27, calls
for the appointment of makhateer by the military government. In the early 1980s, some 826 people
serving in a mukhtar capacity received small stipends from the military government in addition to fees
earned by authenticating documents. Moshe Drori, Local Government in Judea and Sumaria, in
MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967-1980, THE LEGAL
ASpEcrS 237, 243 (Meir Shamgar ed., 1982) [hereinafter MILITARY GOVERNMENT]. The unpopularity
of Israeli rule and the use of makhateer to compel unwanted regulations has diminished the credibility
of some makhateer. "By the mid-1980s, makhateers were frequently considered collaborationists."
DAVID McDowALL, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: THE UPRISING AND BEYOND 107 (1989).
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truce (atwa).4 After the conclusion of the atwa, respected men formed a
formal reconciliation committee to mediate the dispute. Some disputes
remained unresolved, but in many, both parties eventually agreed to a binding
settlement (a sulh).47 Parties to such disputes may have had mixed motiva-
tions for complying with the process and the sulh: the committee members
were both legitimate decision-makers, by virtue of their status within the
community,4" and potentially coercive enforcers, by virtue of their physical
resources.4 9 This blend of legitimacy and coercion enabled disputants to
accept a judgment without losing honor.
Inheritance disputes provide a modern example of the use of customary
dispute resolution processes. The Israeli military has ordered that land shares
inherited by Palestinians categorized as "absentees" during the 1967 war
revert to the state. Thus, heirs disputing an inheritance with an absentee
sibling have relied on customary dispute resolution so as not to involve the
government.5°
Beginning in the British Mandate period after World War I, customary law
often functioned parallel to or overlapped with the civil court system.
Similarly, during the current Occupation, "judges in the civil courts generally
appear to tolerate the competing systems, sometimes even consciously
accommodating [customary law] by delaying actions in a case while awaiting
a sulh."51
Customary law has continued to play a major role in Palestinian legal
culture because many Palestinians regard it as valid, and because those who
believe in its legitimacy are willing to bring social and physical pressure to
bear on those who do not. Palestinians have sustained the authority of
customary law through four occupations. Customary law has served as an
example of Palestinian control over Palestinian affairs, according to
Palestinian custom. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of customary law is no longer
absolute. Since the intfada began, women's groups, labor unions, and others
have challenged certain aspects of customary law and have limited its use, as
described below.
46. CoHEN, supra note 40, at 141.
47. BisHARAT, supra note 28, at 41. Sulh meetings are also described in Subhi Abu Ghosh, The
Politics of an Arab Village in Israel 67, 130-31 (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton).
48. Committee members were generally respected men who had to be neutral and approved by both
sides; in addition, the parties themselves participated in the discussions, and had agreed to the terms
of the sulM. CO-EN, supra note 40, at 142.
49. The committee members were generally powerful men, and had the support of the family or
hamula. Id.
50. BIsHARAT, supra note 28, at 32.
51. Id. at 42.
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B. Islamic Religious Law
The embryonic Palestinian legal regime derives important aspects of its
rules and procedures from the Islamic heritage of the decision-makers.
Religious heritage is an important social characteristic of the Palestinian
community: "[a]s in the Middle East in general, religiosity within both
Muslim and Christian communities is strong, especially in the rural areas;
even in the towns and cities, religion and sect constitute important components
of social identity."52 Given religion's major role in Palestinian life and self-
definition, many Palestinians look to religious courts as legitimate arbiters of
appropriate social behavior.53
For Palestinian Muslims the sharia, the Islamic law found in the Koran
and other sources, provides rules that govern day to day life. The sharia is a
comprehensive code of behavior that embraces both public and private
conduct, and in theory governs crimes, torts, contracts, trusts and estates, and
family law.54 Since the eighteenth century, sharia courts have used this law
to decide disputes on matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, child
custody, alimony) and inheritance, and to decide when to award diya.55 Prior
to the nineteenth century, sharia courts were the only formal courts in
Ottoman Palestine. 6 In the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman reforms known
as the Tanzimat centralized political authority, modernized the state bureau-
cracy,57 and established civil courts. The latter development gradually dimin-
ished the power of the sharia courts.5"
52. Id. at 11.
53. The vast majority of Palestinians are Sunni Muslim. A Christian minority composed of several
denominations comprises eight percent of the Palestinian population. This minority is centered in
Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. Id. at 197, n.41.
54. For general discussions of Islamic law see JAMES N. D. ANDERSON, ISLAMIC LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD (1959); MATTHEW LIPPMAN ET AL., IsLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
(1988); Hassan Afchar, Muslim Conception of Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 84 (1975); Chafik Chehata, Islamic Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 138 (1975); Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Law and Religion in the Muslim Middle East,
35 AM. J. COMP. L. 127 (1987): Farhat J. Ziadeh, Permanence and Change in Arab Legal Systems,
9 ARAB STUD. Q. 20 (1987). For a description of Jordanian religious law, formerly applicable in the
West Bank, see Fouad B. Attala, Jordan, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
J-27 (1973). For an Israeli view of the functioning of the religious courts from 1967-80 see generally
Yaakov Meron, The Religious Courts in the Administered Territories in MILITARY GOVERNMENT, supra
note 45, at 353.
55. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 20. For a concise history of the sharia courts, see Zeina
Ghandour, Religious Law in a Secular State: The Jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts of Palestine and
Israel, 5 ARAB L.Q. 25 (1990).
56. Bentwich, supra note 18, at 36.
57. BIsHARAT, supra note 28, at 19.
58. Anis Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, 1 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 19,
21 (1984). For a concise history of the sharia courts, see Ghandour, supra note 55, at 25. BISHARAT,
supra, note 28, at 44, provides a chart of the Islamic court system. In Gaza, "Sharia Courts are located
in five towns,.. . with an Appeal Court in Gaza Town." Paul Hunt, Some Aspects of Law and Practice
in the Occupied Territories, 2 J. REFUGEE STUD. 152, 153 (1989).
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Today, the religious courts that remain are managed by the Supreme
Muslim Council, a group not officially recognized by the Israelis, but
nonetheless allowed to operate.59 Cases in the religious courts are heard in
Arabic, often without lawyers. Judicial determination is fairly rapid; most
cases are decided in two months time.6° However, the rulings of these courts
are often ineffectual because Israel does not enforce these courts' orders."
This indicates that however legitimate some Palestinians may find religious
courts, others are unwilling to obey religious courts without some threat of
force. Perhaps for this reason, Palestinians' use of these courts since the
beginning of the intifada has declined. Some of the work of religious courts
in the Territories has been supplanted by intifada justice committees,62 the
UNLU, and private individuals who now often handle such personal status
matters as mediating spousal quarrels and regulating bride price (mahr)
reductions. It seems that Palestinians stopped going to religious courts to
resolve these matters in part because they no longer accepted as legitimate the
truly unequal treatment women received under the traditional approaches.63
C. Ottoman Law
Each of the foreign occupations of the region brought legal traditions that
have affected current Palestinian legal culture. Ottoman law is the oldest of
these foreign traditions. The Ottoman empire ruled the Middle East for four
hundred years, superimposing its own civil code on pre-existing Islamic and
customary law. The Ottoman law applicable today is primarily real property
law. Since land ownership is central to the Palestinians' territorial struggle,
the choice of land law is of vital symbolic importance." While real property
issues are addressed by almost all of the legal sources that currently influence
the Palestinians, the Ottoman Land Code is the oldest concerning land
holdings in the West Bank and Gaza. Although Palestinians relied on the
59. MERON BENVENISTI, THE WEST BANK HANDBOOK: A POLmCAL LEXICON 201-02 (1986). For
more information on the Supreme Muslim Council, see generally ANN MOSELY LEsCH, ARAB POLITICs
IN PALESTINE 1917-1939 (1979).
60. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 120-21.
61. JOHN HENDY, OCCUPIED PALESTINE: TRADE UNIONS AND T E LAW 30 (1989). As a result
of the prohibition against enforcement, decisions of sharia courts in the Territories are not recognized
in Israel, and claimants must start new suits in sharia courts in Israel if they want a judgment enforced
in Israel. BISfrARAT, supra note 28, at 141.
62. See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
63. Marwan Darweish, The Inffada: Social Change, RACE AND CLASS, Oct.-Dec. 1989, at 47,
47-56. According to Rita Giacaman, women activists see replacement of the sharia with egalitarian civil
legislation as a critical step toward improving the status of women. Rita Giacaman & Penny Johnson,
Palestine Women: Building Barricades and Breaking Barriers, in INTiFADA: THE PASINIAN
UPRISINa, supra note 1, at 155, 168. See also infra notes 266-304 and accompanying text.
64. BIsHARAT, supra note 28, at 127 (noting view that "struggle for control over the land, regarded
as the national patrimony of the Palestinian people and the key to their sumud, or steadfastness... is
a sacred responsibility.")
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Ottoman Land Code long after the Ottomans left the region, the Israelis' use
of Ottoman land law in a manner that disadvantaged Palestinian property
holders has delegitimized Ottoman law in the eyes of Palestinians.
In 1979, the Israeli High Court ruled that Palestinian land could not be
confiscated for nonsecurity reasons.65 In response, the government devised
a process to take Palestinian land which conformed with the High Court's
ruling. This process relied on the distinction in Ottoman law between state-
owned land (miri) and privately-owned land (mulk).66 Beginning in December
1979 the government conducted a comprehensive land survey of the West
Bank which revealed that the majority of the land had not been properly
registered under Turkish or Jordanian law as privately owned land. This
enabled the military government to declare all such unregistered land in the
territories to be state-owned miri land, subject to Israeli confiscation.67 Thus,
Palestinian landholders who possessed valid tax receipts were dispossessed of
land they had occupied for years.6" Israeli settlements were then built on
confiscated land.69 Similar land in Israel, however, has not been treated in
this way.7' Whereas only thirteen percent of the West Bank was considered
state land in 1967, today approximately sixty percent of the West Bank is state
land. 71 Relief from the Israeli High Court is unavailable, since it refuses to
hear appeals concerning state land.72 Because the Israelis have used Ottoman
law in this manner, Ottoman law is no longer considered a legitimate source
of law by Palestinians; as a result, Palestinians currently eschew Ottoman-
based rules, institutions, and procedures, and are trying to develop their own
institutions and rules for resolving land disputes.
D. British Mandate Law
After World War I, the League of Nations carved up the territories of the
defeated Ottoman empire and granted Great Britain a Class A Mandate over
Palestine, the area now embracing Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, and the
65. Mustafa Dwaikat v. Government of Israel (The Elon Moreh Case), -. C. 390/79, 34(l) Piskei
Din [Judicial Decisions] 1 (1979), reprinted in MILITARY GOvERNMENT, supra note 45, at 404. For
a brief description of this case see BENVENISTI, supra note 59, at 106-07.
66. RAjA SHE-ADEH, OCCUPIERS LAw 28 (1985) [hereinafter SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS].
67. id.
68. Id. at 31; BIsHARAT, supra note 28, at 140.
69. Carol Bisharat, Palestine and Humanitarian Law: Israeli Practice in the West Bank and Gaza,
12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 325, 347 (1989). For discussion of the process of forcing Pales-
tinians off this land see GEOFFREY ARONSON, CREATING FACTS: ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS AND THE WEST
BANK 108-16 (1987).
70. In Israel the government converted such mii land into private mulk land held by those Israeli
citizens who had occupied it previously. Israel Land Law (1969), 153; SIHEADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra
note 66, at 26; Bisharat, supra note 69, at 347.
71. SHEHADEH, OccuPImRS, supra note 66, at 213.
72. Id. at 21 (referring to Elon Moreh case, supra note 65).
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Gaza Strip.73 In 1922, Great Britain divided the Mandate into two jurisdic-
tions and established the principality of Transjordan east of the Jordan River.
When violence escalated between the British, Zionists, and Palestinians,
the British passed emergency regulations which limited civil liberties. The
Palestinians perceived these regulations and other alterations in the pre-
existing legal regime as intrusive and illegitimate.74 Today, Israel still
invokes the British Defense Emergency regulations of 1945 to justify curfews,
expulsions, censorship, and house demolitions.75 Since these Mandate
regulations, like the Ottoman land laws, are used to restrict the liberties of the
Palestinian people, they are not viewed as legitimate by the Palestinian
population; thus the intifada decision-makers do not include institutions, rules,
or procedures from British mandate law in their new legal structures.
E. Jordanian and Egyptian Civil Law
The first Arab-Israeli war started in 1948 when neighboring Arab states
invaded the newly declared State of Israel. The four armistice agreements
between Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel which followed the
conflict gave Israel control over seventy-seven percent of the territory of
Mandate Palestine (other than Transjordan), including West Jerusalem.76
Jordan, which had become an independent state in 1946, occupied and
annexed East Jerusalem and the West Bank area of the Jordan River,
73. A class A mandate was a quasi-colonial form of governance established for "advanced"
territories whose independence was envisioned by the League of Nations. HAZEm Z. NusamEH,
PALESTINE AND THE UNrrED NATIONS 19 (1981).
74. For a discussion of British Mandate law, see generally BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 21-26;
Bentwich, supra note 18, at 33. For a discussion of Mandate policy and its effect on Palestinian society,
see Anis Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, I PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 19, 23-24
(1984); Ylana Miller, Administrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British Norms on Arab
Community Life 1920-1948, in PALESIAN SOCIErY AND POLITIcs 124 (Joel S. Migdal ed., 1980).
Israel's High Court has defined one section of the emergency regulations as a "Draconian provision
passed by a colonial regime and incompatible with the basic values of a democratic state." Moshe
Nebgi, Paper Tiger: The Struggle for Press Freedom in Israel, 39 JERUSALEM Q. 17, 18 (1986).
75. British Defense Regulations of 1945, from 1937 Orders in Council, discussed in NLG, supra
note 8, at 13. Curfews authorized by Regulation 124. Id. at 69. Expulsions permissible under
Regulation 112. Id. at 62. For a discussion of specific issues see Cheryl V. Reicin, Preventive
Detention, Curfews, Demolition of Houses, and Deportations: An Analysis of Measures Employed by
Israel in the Administered Territories, 8 CARmOzo L. REv. 515 (1987); Ghada Talhami, The Palestinian
Perception of the Human Rights Issue, 13 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 475, 482-3 (1987)
(deportation). While these regulations only apply in legally declared states of emergency, Israel has been
in such a state of emergency since its independence in 1948. ZE'EV SEGAL, DEMOKRATIA ISRAELI
[ISRAELI DEMOcRAcY] 152, 158 (1990). The continuing validity of these regulations was upheld by the
Israeli High Court in 1979 when it said that the regulations had "neither been implicitly or explicitly
repealed." Abu Awad v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, H.C. 97/79, 33(3) Piskei Din
[Judicial Decisions] 309 (1979) (English summary in ISRAELI Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343 (1979)).
76. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF
Tm STATE OF ISRAEL 8 (Joseph Badi ed., 1961). Israel signed Armistice agreements with Egypt on
February 24, 1949; with Lebanon on March 23, 1949; with Jordan on April 3, 1949; and with Syria
on July 20, 1949. HENRY CATrAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1976).
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spreading Jordanian civil law to those areas 77 Egypt took control of the
Gaza Strip and imposed its own set of laws in that region.78 On the first day
of the Israeli occupation in 1967, the new military regime declared that local
law (Jordanian, Egyptian, Mandate, Islamic, and customary) would remain in
force.79 Over the last twenty-five years, the Israeli government has limited
the application of Jordanian law in the West Bank, and Egyptian law in Gaza,
to certain land, trademark, criminal80 and landlord-tenant disputes. While the
intifada utilizes some of these laws, it rejects those that are outdated,"' or are
used by the military government against Palestinians.82
Cases employing Jordanian or Egyptian law are heard in Israeli-
administered civil courts83 that are entirely subordinate to an Israeli military
77. SHAUL MIsHAL, WEST BANK/EAST BANK: THE PALESrINIANs IN JoRDAN, 1949-1967, at 1,
6 (1978) (discussing political situation of Palestinians during Jordanian period).
78. For a discussion of Jordanian and Egyptian law from 1948-1967, see Kassim, supra note 74,
at 27-29. The Egyptian Administration reinstated most of the basic legislation from the Ottoman and
Mandate years. It also passed Basic Law No. 255 which served as a constitution, leaving all prior laws
in place to the extent they did not conflict with the Basic Law. In 1962 Egypt passed a constitutional
order emphasizing Palestinian identity. Id. at 29. Egypt held the Gaza Strip from 1949 to 1967 but did
not claim sovereignty. It asserted that it was holding the area pending the exercise of self-determination
by the population. John Quigley, David v. Goliath: Humanitarian and Human Rights Law in Light of
the Palestinian Right ofSelf-Detennination andRight to Recapture Territory Taken by Force, 21 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & PoL. 489, 490-91 (1989). "It published laws in the Palestine Gazette" and "treated Gaza
as 'an inseparable part of the land of Palestine.'" Id. "Court judgments were 'delivered & executed in
the name of the people of Palestine.'" Id. at 491. The 1962 constitution decreed for Gaza was supposed
to remain in force until a permanent constitution was promulgated for Palestine. Id.
79. Proclamation of Commander of Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank Region on Law and
Administration, June 7, 1967, § 2, reprinted and translated in 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 419-20 (1971).
There was some dispute over whether the British Mandate-period Defense Emergency Regulations had
been in force; the Jordanian government claimed that they had not been. Reicin, supra note 75, at 536-
37.
80. Local penal laws have been repealed or suspended "only where they constitute a threat to
security or an obstacle to the continuation of orderly government." ESTHER R. COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE ISRAELI-OCCuPIED TERpriOals 1967-1982, at 107 n.183. In effect this means that many
criminal offenses are heard in the military tribunals.
81. For example, the intifada leadership has rejected the 1965 Jordanian labor law in favor of more
modern international standards.See infra notes 245-247 and accompanying text.
82. For example, the Jordanian civil code states that a privately owned parcel of land that is not
cultivated for three years shall revert to the state. Thus, military authorities have attempted to deny an
owner access to land for three or more years in order to seize it. Emergency Regulation 125 states: "A
Military Commander may by order declare any area or place to be a closed area .... Any person who
... enters or leaves.., without a permit... shall be guilty of an offence against these Regulations."
Cited in Bisharat, supra note 69, at 350 n.149.
83. After the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Ramallah, which was the seat of a magistrates'
court, district court, and the Court of Appeals, replaced Jerusalem as the judicial capital of the West
Bank. The Court of Appeals became the highest indigenous court, since access to the Jordanian Court
of Cassation was cut off. For a chart of the West Bank civil court system see BISHARAT, supra note 28,
at 59. There are eight magistrates courts hearing criminal cases carrying fines up to 200 Jordanian
dinars or three years in prison, as well as land, water, and landlord-tenant disputes. There are three
district courts that hear all cases that do not fall into the jurisdiction of the magistrate courts, and also
hear a few appeals. The Court of Appeals contains three judges and hears all appeals from the district
court and most from the magistrate courts. Many plaintiffs and defendants do not use lawyers in cases
involving small fines, traffic violations, etc. As in the U.S. system, many cases settle outside of court.
Like the continental system, there are no juries. There is a similar judicial structure in Gaza.
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commander. He appoints all judges and court personnel and retains all powers
of dismissal and promotion." The local Palestinian civil court judges have
no authority to review his orders or to hear suits against Israeli Defense Force
(IDF) personnel.8' "The single most influential officer in the military
government of the West Bank as regards the local courts is the officer in
charge of the judiciary. He has been vested with all the powers and privileges
of the Minister of Justice under Jordanian Law .... ",86 Allegations of
corruption from Palestinians and Israelis against the judges have been
rampant, and several judges, including the President of the Court of Appeals,
have been convicted. 7 Palestinians view these courts as hostile, intrusive,
inefficient, and therefore, illegitimate. 8 This perception is enhanced by the
fact that Palestinians deny the legitimacy of any Israeli-run institution. For
these reasons, many litigants have taken their legal problems to the few
institutions developed during the intifada.8 9
F. Israeli Civil and Military Law
In the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel quickly defeated the Egyptian,
Jordanian, and Syrian armies. By the end of the war, Israel controlled the
West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Israel
annexed East Jerusalem in 19 67 ,"o and has ended the jurisdiction of
Jordanian courts in that area.91 The international community, however, still
considers the Occupied West Bank to include East Jerusalem.' Under the
84. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 211 n.3.
85. BENVENITI, supra note 59, at 35.
86. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra note 66, at 76.
87. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 130-32. Other problems include: delay in summoning witnesses;
low employee salaries; lack of legal forms; outside interference; disappearance of files; understaffed
judiciary; lack of independent judiciary or bar. SEHADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra note 66, at 224.
88. BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 154, 211 n.3. To demonstrate their perceptions of the illegitimacy
of these courts, Palestinian lawyers and judges went on strike in 1968. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra
note 66, at 79. This further hampered the functioning of the courts in the Occupied Territories.
89. Note that some Palestinians, notably women, have avoided the civil courts for other, cultural,
reasons. Traditionally, Palestinian women avoided court proceedings because the community considered
it shameful for women to appear in court. Thus, the newer, less formal dispute resolution mechanisms
are particularly suited to women, given the cultural taboos against appearing in courts. JOOsT
HILTERMANN, BEHIND ThE INTIFADA: LABOR AND WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED
TFRRrroRrEs 92 (1991).
90. The majority of the world regards as this annexation as legally invalid. The U.N. Security
Council and the General Assembly have both condemned it. S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess.,
1426th meeting, at 9, U.N. Doe. S/INF/23/Rev. 1 (1968); S.C. Res. 267, U.N. SCOR, 24th Sess.,
1485th meeting, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev. 1 (1969); G.A. Res. 2253, (emerg. spec. sess.) (1967)
reprinted in UNnED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: 1947-
1974 (George J. Tomeh ed., 1975).
91. See Kassim, supra note 74, at 31.
92. For discussions of the legal status of Jerusalem see Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on
the International Status ofJerusalema, 3 PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 13, 29-30 (1986); Ibrahim Dakkak,
The Transformation of Jerusalem: Juridical Status and Physical Change, in OCCUPATION: ISRAEL OVER
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Camp David Accords of 1979, Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt. In 1981
Israel extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights; however, it did not formally
annex the area. Since the Palestinians do not accept the Occupation or the
1967 annexation of East Jerusalem, the intifada leadership does not
incorporate Israeli civil law in any way.
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are not subject to Israeli
civil law. Soon after the Occupation began in 1967, Israel introduced a system
of military occupation law for the Occupied Territories to supplement existing
customary, Islamic, Ottoman, British Mandate, and Jordanian and Egyptian
civil law. Israel also acknowledged that international law applied in the
Territories.93 Since 1967 Israel has supplanted approximately 1000 civil laws
in the Occupied Territories with more than 1213 military decrees' that
regulate many areas of daily life.95 Thousands of Palestinians have been
arrested and detained by the military criminal justice process. It is estimated
that from 1967 to 1986, interrogation or arrest under military order affected
250,000 people (one in six people, or one in three over fifteen years of
age).96 Over forty percent of adult males were detained overnight during this
period.97 The level of arrests and detention without charge has escalated
since a March 17, 1988 military order revoked the 1980 procedures for
PALESTIwE 67 (Naseer Aruri ed., 1983); John Quigley, Old Jerusalem: Whose to Govern?, 20 DENv.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 145 (1991). For an Israeli view upholding the annexation of Jerusalem, see Yoram
Dinstein, The United Nations & the Arab-Israeli Conflict, in 2 THE ARAB-Is..ELI CONFU.CT 481 (John
Moore ed., 1974).
93. MiLrrARY GovERNmENT, supra note 45, at 13, 15. A survey of the voluminous literature on
the applicability of the laws of belligerent occupation and international human rights law is beyond the
scope of this article. See Falk & Weston, supra note 3 and citations therein.
94. See BISHARAT, supra note 28, at 47-69 (discussing impact of military system); SHEHADEH,
OccuPimS, supra note 66, at 219 (1213 orders issued as of Dec. 3, 1987); see also Kassim, supra note
74, at 30 (1100 orders in West Bank and 835 orders in Gaza by 1984). In the early years of the
Occupation from 1967 to 1971, the orders were unpublished and were unavailable even to lawyers. Id.
at 35.
95. These areas include immovableproperty; use of water and other resources; authority to operate
banks; agricultural product export; drivers' licenses; travel permits; professional licenses; identity cards;
initiation of businesses; building permits; control of municipal and village councils; arrest without
warrants and administrative detention without charge; assembly; and attorney access to clients.
SHEHADEH, Occurpmis, supra note 66, at 8. For a discussion of freedom of speech, see Norman
Bernstein, Freedom of Speech in the Israeli Occupied Territories: The Search for a Standard, 21
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 527 (1989); John Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and
the Law of Belligerent Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of Assembly
& Expression?, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 1 (1989). For a general discussion of Occupation law
from the Israeli viewpoint see MILrrgY GOVERNMENT, supra note 45.
96. Yezid Sayigh, The Intifada Continues: Legacy, Dynamics, and Challenges, 11 THIRD WoRLD
Q. 20, 23 (1989).
97. Id. at 22. Among the human rights violations found by B'Tselem, the Israeli Information
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories which was founded in 1988, were the following:
(1) failure to inform family members and attorneys of arrest and location of detainees; (2) prison
transfers without documentation or notification to families; (3) failure to allow detainees to meet with
lawyers at time of arrest; and (4) failure to maintain open court hearings or to allow attorneys to be
present at hearings on extension of detention. B'TSELEM, THE MILrrARY JUDIcLAL SYSTEM IN THE
WEST BANK 40 (1989).
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review by a military court and allowed any IDF officer above the rank of
colonel to order detention.9"
One of the most devastating tools of the Israeli military justice system is
deportation - the permanent expulsion of Palestinians from their own home-
land. More than 2000 deportations have been reported since the beginning of
the Occupation.99 More than 400 have been deported since the beginning of
the intifada.1° The Israeli High Court has never overturned a deportation
order. 101
The demolition or sealing of houses is a form of collective punishment.
For example, if the Israelis suspect someone from a particular family or area
of throwing rocks, participating in a demonstration, or attacking a soldier, the
IDF will demolish or seal a house without compensating the owners. 2 The
National Lawyers Guild estimates that as many as 20,000 house demolitions
or sealings have occurred." Israel admitted to demolishing or sealing 1265
houses between 1967 and 198.1' °  B'Tselem has documented that 159
houses were demolished or sealed in the first year of the intifada and 222 in
the second year. 05
In addition, curfews are also utilized as a form of collective punishment.
According to the U.S. State Department's Country Reports, the Israeli
military has imposed "hundreds of curfews, some lasting several weeks."" °
It also has restricted press coverage,"' banned some newspapers for periods
as long as a month, and closed other newspapers indefinitely.
Israeli military law clearly has had a negative impact on the Palestinian
community; therefore, the intifada leadership rejects the application of Israeli
military law and the military court system. 0 8 Overall, Palestinians reject
98. Quigley, supra note 78, at 511 & n.139 (referring to Order Covering Administrative Arrests,
Interim Instruction No. 1229 for West Bank, and No. 91 for Gaza).
99. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra note 66, at 229.
100. The PLO: Is it ime to Talk, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 1993, at 44.
101. B'TSELEM, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT: VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRIToRIEs 54 [hereinafter B'TSELEM, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT]; Wendy Olson, Note, U.N. Security
Council Resolution Regarding Deportations from Israeli Administered Territories, 24 STAN. J. INT'L.
L. 611, 633 (1988).
102. B'TsELEM, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 41.
103. NLG, supra note 8, at 65.
104. Id.
105. B'TSELEm, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 44-45.
106. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, The Occupied Territories, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1989, at 1441 (Joint Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter 1989 COUNTRY REPORTS].
107. Quigley, supra note 78, at 520.
108. The military courts often do not comport with traditional notions of justice. Offenders before
these courts have no absolute right of legal representation. Furthermore, in a large number of the cases,
the judgment is based upon a confession written by a military officer in Hebrew, a language few
Palestinians can speak, read, or write. SHEHADEH, OCCUPIERS, supra note 66, at 87. "Military courts
tried almost 3000 cases in 1984-85, almost 40% concerning illegal demonstrations and rock-throwing.
Almost all received prison sentences, double the number in 1983. A typical sentence for rock-throwing
is nine months imprisonment." MERON BENVENIMST, AMEICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 1986 REPORT:
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those legal traditions that have harmed them, especially Mandate, Ottoman,
and Israeli military law, and the intifada leadership has not utilized these
systems in any way. By contrast, intifada decision-makers incorporate those
aspects of customary, Islamic, Egyptian civil, and Jordanian civil law that
they regard as legitimate components of the new norms and procedures the
intifada legal actors are crafting. All these choices indicate an attempt to
create a new tradition more consistent with evolving community values.
IV. NEW ACTORS
Palestinian legal actors traditionally have been highly respected men who
have served as religious or customary leaders, customary law mediators,
Islamic judges (qadis), and lawyers (muhamein).'" The numbers and types
of legal actors have expanded during the intifada. This change has
significantly nullified many of the traditional patterns of Third World Leadership
[including past Palestinian leadership], which rely on systems of notables and
dignitaries and big names, who also rely for their credibility and power base either
on external sources of strength, like their connections with the colonial regime or
an external power, or on family connections and wealth within their society. The
UNLU in a sense has reinforced the people's legitimacy, the voice of the people
rather than the voice of the notables and the dignitaries."1 '
Thus, the intifada is in many ways also an attempt to shake off the traditional
leadership of elders and notables, to bring about dramatic changes in the class
and age of legal actors."' To illustrate, the National Guidance Committee
(NGC) established in 1978 "consisted of familiar public figures drawing their
authority from political and social status," while the membership of the
UNLU "appear[s] to be relatively youthful and educated and drawn widely
from lower and middle social strata, with a significant number of
professionals and self-employed persons." ' The emergence of more
DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIc, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND PoLrrICAL DEVELOPMENTs IN THE WEsT BANK 39
(1986). Since guilty verdicts are almost a foregone conclusion, the lawyers are consigned "to the role
of beggars for mercy." BisHARAT, supra note 28, at 163. Convictions are seldom overturned, Quigley,
supra note 78, at 510, but defendants can appeal to the Israeli High Court. "The Israeli Supreme Court
has two functions: to serve as an appellate court in civil and criminal appeals from judgments of District
Courts, and to sit as a High Court of Justice. The Israeli High Court of Justice, based on the English
legal prototype, presides over litigation between the individual and the government, exercising judicial
review of the acts of public officials to ensure that the officials do not exceed or abuse their powers."
Esther R. Cohen, Justice for Occupied Territory? The Israeli High Court of Justice Paradigm, 24
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 471, 471 n.1 (1986). Professor Cohen finds that the Israeli practice (as
occupier) of allowing the occupied Palestinians to assert challenges to the High Court is a "novelty in
international practice." Id. She further argues that the High Court has been effective in preventing abuse
by the military government. Id. at 496.
109. See generally BIsHARAT, supra note 28.
110. Aaron David Miller et al., Tvo Years of Intifada: Its Impact on American, Israeli, and
Palestinian Political Climates, 31 AM. ARAB AFF. 29, 35 (1989-90) (quoting Professor Hanan
Ashrawi).
111. Darweish, supra note 63, at 57.
112. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 29.
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youthful legal actors is a function of the interaction of demographics and the
duration of the Occupation. Eighty percent of Palestinians are under thirty
years old and have but hazy recollections of life before occupation; sixty-five
percent of Palestinians are under twenty years old and have grown up entirely
under occupation.113 Interestingly, growing up under Israeli occupation has
emboldened young people to challenge rather than to accept the political status
quo of occupation.11
4
In addition to the clandestine UNLU members, the new leadership includes
a network of public "personalities" who are frequently referred to in local,
national, and international media. They tend to be younger than traditional
dignitaries, but older than the youth that have grown up entirely under
occupation. This middle-aged group consists of working professionals such as
academics, intellectuals, journalists, publishers, lawyers, and business-
men." 5 While some, like Faisal Husseini, come from prominent fami-
lies,"' many traditionally would not have become important figures. These
people owe their significance to their roles in the intifada. Like UNLU
members, then, these personalities represent a change from the traditional
social structure.
Another example of change brought about by the intifada is the growing
importance of women. Professor Julie Peteet notes:
Long-term conflict makes for flux as gender roles and ideologies are blurred and
subject to conscious reexamination. Households are mobilized for communal
defense, and women take on tasks usually associated with men. Yet there also
occurs a process of feminization of specific sectors of the national movement. Both
processes involve a complex reconceptualization of gender., 7
Traditionally, Palestinian women were not political actors. That Palestinians
have a fertility rate of seven births per woman might lead one to believe that
women would have little time for political activity.1 During the intifada
however, the political participation of women has been "comprehensive, direct
and active. "119
113. McDowALL, supra note 45, at 105.
114. Id. In addition, some believe that "Israel [has] helped cultivate the new Palestinian leadership
by channeling some 20,000 young people through its prisons and then releasing them." ISRAEL'S THIRD
FRONT, supra note 8, at 218. Prison time produces seasoned activists who have received political
education from fellow prisoners, led hunger strikes, broadcasted appeals, and managed relations between
political factions within the prison. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 23. In addition, these prisoners established
popular committees in the cell blocks that were models for the intifada popular committees. ISRAEL'S
THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 214.
115. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 26.
116. JOHN WALLACH & JANET WALLACH, THE NEw PALESTINIANS: THE EMERGING GENERATION
OF LEADERs 43 (1992).
117. JULIE M. PETEET, GENDER IN CRISIS: WOMEN & THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT
8 (1991).
118. BENVENiSTI, supra note 59, at 2.
119. Giacaman, supra note 63, at 142 (citing UNION OF PALERTNAN WORKING WOMEN'S
COMMIrrEEs, PALESTINIAN WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE UPRIsING: EYE-WITNESs AccouNTs 1 (1988)).
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Prior to the intifada, students and long-term activists constituted the core
of female involvement against Israeli occupation. 20 When the intifada
began, women of all ages and from all sectors (including those from rural
areas, villages, and refugee camps) became involved. They have mobilized
their households, staged demonstrations, formed committees, and been
arrested, killed, and wounded.' At least one woman has served in an urban
defense committee," and several older and less educated women have
served in the village and camp defense committees. " Feminization of
specific sectors of the national movement is indicated by female predominance
in teaching children, providing child daycare, collecting clothing, and other
areas. This represents a slight expansion of women's traditional roles as
sustainers and nurturers who did not work or volunteer outside the home. 24
It is unclear how many women have been involved in the UNLU, the
NRC, or in other non-traditional leadership positions. Customary norms and
the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism have prevented women from
playing prominent roles in the leadership of the uprising." In addition,
women's responsibilities as de facto heads of large households (in which
several male family members may be in prison, in hiding, injured, dead, or
deported) hinder women's ability to be public leaders. Although the UNLU
may have included women at various times, an analysis of the communiques
and the pattern of arrests and deportations suggests the leadership is generally
male.126
The most striking international evidence of women's participation in the
intifada was the PLO's selection of Professor Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, Birzeit
University Dean of the Faculty of Arts, as the principal spokesperson for the
Palestinians during the peace negotiations that started in 1991. While her
urbane Western-educated demeanor has won admiration in many circles,
vociferous critics at home feel these very characteristics make her an
inappropriate representative for the Palestinian masses.' 27 Rather than
indicating an increase in female political participation, her selection is
aberrational at this point in time and its significance should not be overstated.
120. Joost R. I-iltermann, The Women's Movement During the Intifada, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
Spring 1991, at 48, 49.
121. According to Schiff and Ya'ari, one-fifth of those wounded in the first three months of the
intifada were women. ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 126.
122. Giacaman & Johnson, supra note 63, at 164. For a discussion of the defense committees see
infra notes 167-171 and accompanying text.
123. Islah Jad, From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 134.
124. Id. at 134-35; Hiltermann, supra note 120, at 52-53.
125. Hiltermann, supra note 120, at 53.
126. Id.; Giacaman & Johnson, supra note 63, at 165.
127. WALLACH & WALLACH, supra note 116, at 3. For example, the fundamentalist group Hamas
has called her a "loose" woman. Id. at 30.
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The intifada has thus increased the range of significant Palestinian legal
actors beyond traditional notables, expanding this role to include younger
individuals, middle-class professionals, and even a few women. Most of these
new actors derive their positions from their active roles in the intifada. That
most Palestinians respect and obey these actors and their statements reflects
the legitimacy of the movement in Palestinian eyes.
V. INSTITUTIONS
While embracing or rejecting pre-existing traditions, Palestinian legal
actors have developed new institutions that must operate alongside Israeli-
controlled institutions. The Israeli "civilian administration" manages the day-
to-day affairs of the Territories, largely by passing military edicts. A Palestin-
ian with a civil legal problem may seek judicial relief in the civil courts of the
West Bank or Gaza, in which Israeli-appointed Palestinian judges preside. For
a personal status dispute, such as divorce, inheritance, or custody, a
Palestinian may seek relief in Islamic or Christian religious courts. Customary
mediators may resolve certain disputes. Most criminal matters are heard in
military courts under Israeli-appointed Jewish judges. However, when
Palestinians can choose a dispute resolution mechanism, they almost invariably
prefer a non-Israeli institution. Since many Palestinians view the Israeli-run
institutions as illegitimate, inefficient, and slow, they have turned to the new
institutions created during the intifada.
A. UNLU
The primary legal institution of the intifada is the UNLU. It serves as both
the executive and legislative branches of underground authority. 2 ' In fact,
the UNLU has taken on the "character of an 'embryonic state': coordinating
activities in civil society, administering the provision of certain basic services,
and seeking to control the use of force within the boundaries of its own
territory. "'1 It formulates policies and issues laws in the form of communi-
qu6s known as bayanat.3 ° The UNLU consists of a highly decentralized
network of leadership committees, which ensures that the Israeli military
cannot destroy the UNLU by isolating specific individuals or geographic
areas.' While it may appear that each segment operates autonomously
128. In the intifada, as in many Middle Eastern societies, there is no Western-style separation of
legislative and executive powers.
129. RIGY, supra note 9, at 19.
130. In this article, 'bayan' (pl. bayanat), "communiqud", and "leaflet" are one and the same.
131. One source estimated that UNLU leadership changed at least four times during the first year
of the uprising as a result of arrests and rotation. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 33.
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under its own local committee, a supreme leadership unites to issue the
communiqu6s.'3 According to one theory, the central committee has sixteen
members - eight from Gaza, eight from the West Bank - with six Sunni
Muslims, two Christians, and eight drawn from the major parties. 33
Unfortunately, given the need for security, it is impossible to determine if this
description represents the UNLU's actual structure.
The UNLU consists of representatives of the four political factions of the
PLO that have a following in the West Bank:13 ' Fatah, which is the party
of Yasser Arafat and the largest by far; 35 the Palestine Peoples Party
(PPP), formerly called the Palestine Communist Party (CP); 136 the Demo-
cratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP);137 and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 3 These groups represent four of the
eight political factions in the PLO.'39 A fifth group, not part of the PLO,
is Hamas, the Islamic resistance movement that arose during the Islamic
revival that began in 1978, and re-emerged shortly after the uprising. Hamas
often works with, but is not an actual part of, the UNLU leadership."4
Another smaller fundamentalist group that is not part of the UNLU is the
Islamic Jihad; it also seeks to establish an Islamic state in Palestine.' 4 '
132. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 30.
133. McDoWALL, supra note 45, at 267 n.8.
134. For charts of PLO structure and general information see ABDALLAH FRANGI, THE PLO AND
PALESTINE 146-50 (Paul Knight trans., 1983). See generally ALAN HART, ARAFAT: TERRORIST OR
PEACEMAKER? (1984); KEMAL Knusci, THE PLO AND WORLD PoLrrIcs (1986); CHERYL A.
RUBENBERG, THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION: ITS INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (1983).
135. Although no precise figures exist, Fatah is thought to represent 85% to 90% of all Palestin-
ians. Interviews with PLO representatives to the United Nations, in New York, N.Y. (1989) (transcript
on file with author). Other sources estimate Fatah represents 65%-70% of all Palestinians. Interview
with J, supra note 30.
136. The CP changed its name to Palestinian Peoples Party (PPP) in late 1991, and has been
included in PLO bodies since the 18th PNC. The influence of the PPP in the post-Soviet era is unclear.
Salim Tamari, Left in Limbo, MIDDLE E. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 16-17 [hereinafter Tamari, Left].
137. The DFLP has few members and is weaker than the PFLP and Fatah but stronger than the
CP. Abu-Amr, supra note 29, at 400.
138. The PFLP is probably the second largest group after Fatah. Id.
139. The various factions of the PLO are discussed in CHERYL A. RUBENBERG, ISRAEL AND THE
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST: A ClrrcAL EXAMINATION, 99-100 (1986). The factions vary in their
approaches to centralization of leadership. The Communists, whose main base of support is within the
territories, prefer to have the popular committees play a greater role. Fatah prefers greater
centralization, as well as closer connection with the PLO leadership-in-exile. Abu-Amr, supra note 29,
at 389. Coordination among the groups is not always successful. Although the substance of each leaflet
is discussed by the various groups, one group takes responsibility for drafting each communique. As
a result, some communiquds reflect the views of one faction more than others. Id. at 393.
140. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 205. By January 1989, the UNLU and Hamas were trying to
coordinate their efforts. Occasionally, however, Hamas has insisted on enforcing strike days in defiance
of the UNLU. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 37.
141. McDOWAUL, supra note 45, at 109. Islamic Jihad and Hamas are rivals who differ in tactics,
although both want an Islamic state in Palestine. Hamas is stronger and more vocal. See Roy, supra
note 5, at 77. A 1989 accord between Hamas and the PLO provides that Hamas will support PNC
resolutions until independence is achieved. After independence, Hamas will compete in the
parliamentary arena. Ann Lesch, Prelude to the Uprising in the Gaza Strip, J. PALESTINE STUD.,
117
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The UNLU is the latest incarnation of PLO leadership within the
Territories. 42 The relationship between leadership inside the Territories and
that outside appears symbiotic rather than dictatorial. Those inside make their
wishes and interests known, and the outside leadership "can issue orders and
[be] obeyed precisely because and to the extent that it represents [the people
within the Territories], their needs, and their aspirations."' 43 Additionally,
during the intifada decision-makers and groups in the Territories have
acquired much more influence within the PLO and increased responsibility for
planning activities on the ground. The intifada has strengthened, not
weakened, links between internal and external Palestinian structures.'44
One example of the symbiosis between inside and outside leadership is the
drafting of the intifada's primary legislation, the communiqu6s.145 From an
early stage of the intifada, the bayanat were signed by the "Palestine
Liberation Organization, Unified National Leadership of the Palestinian
Uprising in the Occupied Territories," indicating that the UNLU is an arm of
the PLO.'" Communiqu6s are sometimes sent by facsimile or courier to
Tunis, the PLO headquarters, for approval. 47 The drafts are then returned
by facsimile. 14
Given the difficulties of communication, the degree to which the UNLU
can act independently of the PLO leadership-in-exile has on occasion become
an issue. For example, UNLU bayan No. 10 of March 10, 1988 called on
Palestinian deputies in the Jordanian Parliament to resign. This action angered
both the Jordanians and the PLO Fatah faction leadership-in-exile. As a
result, the UNLU was forced to issue a second version of the communiqu6
omitting this call.' 49 This revision indicates that the external PLO leadership
Autumn 1990, at 1, 21. Hamas emphasizes internal societal reform rather than military struggle against
Israel. Islamic Jihad is clandestine and favors armed struggle (jihad) against Israel. Roy, supra note 5,
at 77.
142. Daoud Kuttab, A Profile of the Stonethrowers, J. PALF.STINE. STUD., Spring 1988, at 20.
Under Israeli occupation, Palestinian leadership consisted of the Palestinian National Front (PNF) from
1973 until it was outlawed in 1979, followed by the National Guidance Committee (NGC) which was
outlawed in 1982. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 6-7.
143. Jonathan Kuttab, The Children's Revolt, J. PALESTINE STUD. Summer 1988, at 26, 31. Schiff
and Ya'ari have described the process by which the outside PLO has been able to exert increasing
leadership over the UNLU. See generally ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT, supra note 8; see also Helga
Baumgarten, Discontented People and Outside Agitators: The PLO in the Palestinian Uprising, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 207.
144. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 4.
145. See infra notes 209 -233 and accompanying text.
146. HiLTERMANN, supra note 89, at 211, 238 n.18 (describing issuance of first few bayanat and
role played by four political factions). But see PERETz, INTIFADA: THE PALESTNlAN UPIisING 92
(1991) (indicating that "the bayanat of the UNLU contained the name of the PLO as a co-equal in
leadership").
147. ARoNSoN, supra note 69, at 331; IsRAEL'S THRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 209.
148. ARoNsoN, supra note 69, at 331.
149. See Abu-Amr, supra note 29, at 393. Rigby indicates that the first version was issued by the
PFLP. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 20.
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may have some veto power over proposals of the internal UNLU leadership.
B. Popular Committees
In the beginning of the intifada, each locality formed various popular
committees (lian sha'biya) which became involved in day-to-day underground
governance. 150 By May 1988, there were 45,000 functioning local commit-
tees of various types.' The local popular committees elected representa-
tives to larger coordinating committees, which in turn established regional
ties, and then linked up with the UNLU.152 It appears, however, that the
local committee structure had broken down in many localities even prior to
the Gulf crisis as the result of massive arrests and infiltration of committees
by Israeli informants. 53 During the Gulf War, round-the-clock curfews
suspended almost all aspects of the intifada.54 The committees had not
revived as of September 1992.1
Due to the likelihood of arrest, the membership of any one committee
fluctuated. This suggests the availability of a large number of leadership
candidates and an organization that could accommodate flexibility without
crippling security leaks. In addition, the deliberate redundancy in local
command structures such as UNLU branches, unions, relief, action, and youth
committees enabled a local leadership system to remain intact despite
arrests. 56 No one committee or person was irreplaceable. The UNLU
encouraged women to become active in executive functions of the popular
150. These committees succeeded those formed in many localities in the early 1980s to provide
security, medical care, emergency food supplies, and collective agriculture. See Mustafa Barghouti,
Popular/Mass Movement in the Community, 2 J. REFUGEE STUD. 125, 128 (1989). They are also
successors to the voluntary work committees of the 1970s. Husain Jameel Bargouti, Jeep Versus Bare
Feet: The Villages in the Inufada, in CROssRoADs, supra note 8, at 107, 108.
151. John Kifner, Israelis and Palestinians Change Their Tactics But Not Their Goals, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1988, at Al; NLG, supra note 8, at 80. In August 1988, the Israeli government
outlawed the popular committees. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 32. Membership became a criminal offense,
as. did attendance at a meeting of, possession of literature of, or contribution of money to a popular
committee. Military Order 378 sets a penalty of ten years imprisonment. Id. After declaring the commit-
tees illegal, the government made mass arrests of persons believed to be committee members. Then-
Defense Minister Rabin put 200 to 300 alleged members in administrative detention. Israel Says It
Seized 200 Arabs to Crush a Political Network, N.Y. TIMS, Sept. 10, 1988, at A28. See also IsRAEL's
THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 210; Quigley, supra note 78, at 522. Despite their illegal status, the
committees organized daily life by protecting property, as well as setting up food committees to
determine needs in curfew areas and to arrange collection and distribution of donations. These actions
helped place de facto control of daily life in Palestinian hands and thereby helped build a measure of
self-sufficiency. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 22-25.
152. NLG, supra note 8, at 12.
153. Interviews with A and B, of Nablus, in Iowa City, Iowa (Jan. 1992).
154. See infra note 331 and accompanying text.
155. Interviews with Z and Q, in Iowa City, Iowa (Sept. 1992).
156. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 31. One local activist reported that it took only two to three weeks
in the beginning of the intifada to replace a local committee after its complete dismantlement by Israeli
security forces. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 33.
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committees'57 relating to their traditional role as "sustainers,"' S8 such as
medical relief, food distribution, and fund raising. 5 9 Women collected
donations, ran blood banks, passed out leaflets, watched for soldiers, and
looked after families of the dead, arrested, and wounded."6° In addition,
women became the core of the home economy movement to develop
Palestinian self-sufficiency and boycott Israeli goods. Women also organized
and operated income-generating projects outside their homes."
In December 1988 the women's organizations affiliated with Fatah (the
Women's Committee for Social Work), the DFLP (the Palestine Federation
of Women's Action Committees), the PFLP (the Palestine Federation of
Women's Committees), and the CP (the Association of the Palestine Working
Women's Committees) formed the Higher Women's Council.' 62 Representa-
tives of these groups have actively intervened in domestic disputes at women's
request. 163 These groups "perceive themselves to be fully equal participants
in the national movement, not mere adjuncts to the male leaders and combat-
ants."'" The aim of the Council is to strike a balance between the national
liberation struggle and women's social struggle. 16
C. Police
The relationship between a community under occupation and its police is
understandably hostile. When UNLU Communiqu6 No. 10 of March 10, 1988
called on all Palestinian police in the Territories to resign, two-thirds of them
turned in their weapons and uniforms within weeks. 66 Some of these former
policemen serve in the defense or guard committees, strike forces (al quwwa
al darriba),167 or the popular army (jaysh shaabi filistini).16 The defense
157. Abu-Amr, supra note 29, at 399. For a discussion of the role of women see Darweish, supra
note 63, at 59; Miller et al., supra note 110, at 36; Giacaman & Johnson, supra note 63, at 155; Eileen
Kuttab, Community Development Under Occupation: AnAlternative Strategy, 2 . REFUcEE STUD. 131,
135; Sayigh, supra note 96, at 37; Jad, supra note 123, at 134-35.
158. PERETz, supra note 146, at 96. Hiltermann also saw women's gains as an extension of their
traditional roles as teachers. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 197; Jad, supra note 123, at 134-35.
159. Darweish, supra note 63, at 59. For a comparison of the roles of Palestinian women with the
roles of women in Lebanon from 1969-1982 see PrET, supra note 117, at 8.
160. ISRAEL's Tuiu FRoNT, supra note 8, at 247.
161. lad, supra note 123, at 136.
162. H LTERmANN, supra note 89, at 198.
163. Joost Hiltermann, Trade Unions and Women's Committees, Sustaining Movement, Creating
Space, MDDLE E. REp., May-Aug. 1990, at 32-36. It is difficult to know whether these interventions
have had any long-term effect. Telephone Interview with Joost I-iltermann (Dec. 1992).
164. PERTrz, supra note 146, at 97.
165. Hiltermann, supra note 120, at 53.
166. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 34.
167. The strike forces often act as the front line troops of the intifada in confrontations with the
Israeli military or settlers. The strike forces also served an internal control function, enforcing UNLU
edicts in their area. The strike forces monitored strike hours and the harassment and punishment of
collaborators. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 22. Strike forces to execute punishments were formed in May
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or guard committees were formed to fill the gap left by the resignation of the
police. They provide advanced warning and protect property from attacks by
Israeli security forces, Israeli settlers, and common criminals.' 69 The UNLU
has reprimanded strike forces utilizing unauthorized force.170 Some strike
forces and other enforcers have taken the law into their own hands by failing
to obey UNLU edicts, and some Palestinians fear these groups as much or
more than they fear the Israeli military.17'
D. Judiciary
The intifada's judicial function is performed on two levels, corresponding
approximately to trial and appellate courts. On the highest level is an ad hoc
entity about which very little is known, called the National Reconciliation
Committee (NRC). 72 The NRC generally performs the role of a supreme
court. However, it can exercise original jurisdiction in some cases to resolve
particularly volatile disputes. 73  This latter power is exercised
infrequently. 17
4
The NRC contains equal numbers of members from the various political
factions in the UNLU. Its members are scattered throughout the Occupied
Territories, and are responsible for particular regions. Disputes are heard by
a panel of four representatives (five in Gaza) consisting of one person from
each political faction. Unfortunately, the need for secrecy means that little
information - including that about the nature of the legal traditions utilized
and legal rules implemented - is available about the cases the NRC has
handled. The NRC may even be relatively inactive.
On the local level, popular committees known as justice committees or
1988. GLoRiA EMERSON, GAZA: A YEAR IN THE INT FADA 123 (1991). Each political faction had its
own strike forces. For information on how strike forces have often taken law into their own hands
during the Gulf crisis see infra notes 336-343 and accompanying text.
168. The "popular army," a successor to the strike forces formed in the first year of the intifada
largely of youthful shabab, was named on January 1, 1989, the 24th anniversary of the start of the
armed struggle by Fatah. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 38. The popular army is quite similar to the strike
forces. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 202. Joel Greenberg notes "the consolidation of the 'strike forces' and
'popular army,' which are playing increasingly dominant roles as enforcement arms of the uprising."
Joel Greenberg, The Plight ofthe 'Collaborator, "JERUsALEM PosT, May 5, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Intl file.
169. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 22-23.
170. Salim Tamari, The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie: Urban Merchants and the Palestinian
Uprising, in CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 159, 169.
171. Interviews with A and B, supra note 153; Interviews with Z & Q, supra note 155.
172. The term National Reconciliation Committee was chosen instead of Supreme or High Court
in order to indicate that the system aims to foster national reconciliation. As noted above, Palestinians
customarily utilized reconciliation committees to handle their legal disputes. Using the term "reconcilia-
tion" for their new judicial entities is thus consistent with their legal culture and history. See supra notes
39-50 and accompanying text (discussing traditional mediation).
173. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
174. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30.
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reconciliation committees have handled legal disputes:175 "[I]n January 1989,
the UNLU requested that popular courts try 'thieves, agents, and brokers.'
Underground tribunals were set up to gather evidence, conduct trials and issue
sentences."' 76 Schiff and Ya'ari found that these committees "were formed
to settle disagreements in place of the court system, and often based their
rulings on the rural-popular legal tradition to stress their dissociation from
both Jordanian and Israeli law. " " Although they have utilized custom to
emphasize the historical continuity of the Palestinian community, these
committees have-also instituted new procedures. For example, the committees
now give some of the fines they assess to the poor and needy.178 In the past,
the poor only received assistance through charitable religious and secular
institutions.
Some Palestinians have proposed a National Arbitration Board to handle
certain labor disputes.179 Joost Hiltermann found that there has been an
attempt to substitute reconciliation committees for civil courts to help enforce
workers' rights. 8 ° Popular committees or specially designated labor
arbitration groups may also hear such cases.1 ' Unfortunately, there is no
information available concerning the numbers and types of cases, the
traditions or rules used, or the decisions reached in these labor disputes; this
may be due either to secrecy concerns or to inactivity on the part of the
reconciliation committees. 82
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, the intifada has created new
legal institutions" to replace those Israeli institutions which the Palestinians
regard as illegitimate. These new institutions have varied in legitimacy and
coercive power over time and among regions. Thus even the most developed
and legitimate of these institutions, the UNLU, has at times been unable to
enforce its decrees or to prevent others from exercising "police" powers.
175. Helena Cobban, The PLO and the Intifada, in THE INTIFADA: ITS IMPACT ON ISRAEL, THE
ARAE WORLD AND THE SuPERPOWERS 70, 83 (Robert 0. Freedman ed., 1991) ("reconciliation
committees of trusted community members... replace boycotted court system"). Rigby believes these
social reform committees are "designed to replace the Israeli courts by mediating in disputes between
individuals and families." RIGBY, supra note 9, at 23.
176. HUNr R, supra note 6, at 202-03 (footnote omitted).
177. ISRAEL's THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 247.
178. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 138.
179. Joost Hiltermann, Work and Action: The Role of the Working Class in the Uprising, In
CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 143, 153.
180. Hiltermann, supra note 163, at 36.
181. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30; interview with E, F, 0, and H, labor
organizers, in Jerusalem (Dee. 28, 1989).
182. Interview with loost Hiltermann, supra note 163.
183. Not all of the Palestinians' attempts to create new institutions have succeeded. For example,
Communiqu6 No. 59 of July 2, 1990 stated that a permanent judicial body would be installed to oversee
legal issues in the Territories. Communiqug 59 Calls for International Protection of West Bank, Gaza,
5 WAFA, Palestine News Agency, July 15, 1990, at 3. By September 1992, no such body had
developed. Interview with Z, supra note 155; Interview with S, in Chicago, Ill. (Sept. 1992).
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VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
A procedure of particular importance in the intifada is one that my sources
called mediation.' The traditional Palestinian concept of mediation
encompasses the kind of mediation, arbitration, and adjudication that take
place outside of formal courts in America.8 5 Palestinian culture embraces
an honor system in which potential plaintiffs are proud not to seek monetary
compensation:" 6 "There is also a strong sense that right needs no justifica-
tion or defense, that justice is self-evident. To take affirmative action to
defend oneself is thus to betray a lack of confidence in the righteousness of
one's position."'8 7 Thus, some lawyers report that potential plaintiffs
hesitate to hire lawyers for fear that doing so may make their claims look
weak.188 Injured parties do not pursue claims in the same way as injured
parties in Western systems; claims for monetary damages signal that only
money, not honor, is at stake, or that the victim's honor could be pur-
chased." 9 As a result, responsibility for seeking the resolution of a dispute
lies with the offending party or members of his or her family - it is they who
are fair game for vengeance - or with the "good citizens" of the community,
anxious to restore harmony. 90
Various individuals described a procedure by which the NRC intervenes
to resolve especially serious local disputes.' This process perpetuates the
customary practice of seeking the most influential and powerful community
members to mediate such disputes.'92 Of course, the individuals selected are
not necessarily those who would have performed such tasks before the
intifada.
, One example of NRC intervention is instructive. In October 1989, a
twenty-four year old man, Mahmoud Jadallal al-Falaneh, was stabbed to death
in Saffa (Ramallah) during a confrontation between two groups of Shabab
from different families. One family was apparently aligned with the PFLP
184. Mediation was the one procedure discussed in detail by my sources. See supra note 9.
Unfortunately, the need for secrecy makes it impossible to evaluate accurately the frequency of
mediation. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 144. All informants mentioned that fewer legal disputes have
arisen among Palestinians during the infifada, because people prefer to present a unified front in their
struggle for independence.
185. It is also possible to characterize the secretive way mediation must work during the infada
as indicative of an inquisitional adjudicatory proceeding, bearing only a superficial resemblance to
traditional mediation.
186. Id. at 38.
187. Id. at 39.
188. Id. at 190 n.24. The contrary practice seems to occur in the United States where potential
plaintiffs seek out lawyers to indicate they have a good claim.
189. Id. at 39.
190. Id. at 38.
191. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30.
192. For a discussion of traditional mediation see supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
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political faction and the other with Fatah.193 Because the situation was very
volatile, local leaders called upon the NRC to intervene directly. NRC
representatives immediately followed the customary practice and called an
atwa (truce) to prevent the dispute from escalating. The alleged perpetrator
of the offense took an oath in front of a group of people that he would take
no further act of revenge to escalate the violence. The victim's family also
swore that they would not take revenge. According to customary practice, the
period of atwa lasted three days during which time the NRC committee tried
to establish basic facts. After a second atwa, the families again guaranteed
that they would not take further provocative action. While no information is
available about how the dispute between the families was ultimately settled,
the PFLP issued a communiqu6 on November 9, 1989 that contained the
following declaration:
1) [The PFLP recognizes] the necessity of forming a national committee of
investigation and acting to reveal all the facts surrounding the unfortunate event.
It also appreciates the national reconciliation committee's efforts, its great role in
soothing feelings and its participation in containing this painful event and
preventing the spread of strife among the children of our people.
2) The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine also announces that it is fully
ready to take on any responsibility or obligations resulting from the decisions of
the committee on investigation or the national reconciliation committee.' 9'
This marks a significant departure from customary practice, under which only
a family or clan accepted such responsibility. It indicates that a political party
is now assuming a role previously reserved to the most basic and legitimate
of all Palestinian social organizations, the family or clan.
The mediation process is the same when a local committee rather than the
NRC handles a dispute. During the atwa period(s), a process of investigation
and interviewing witnesses commences. Unlike customary practice, however,
this process must now be clandestine to prevent exposure to the Israelis or
their informants. Interviewers, who are chosen by the committee, are not
required to divulge their role. As a result, a witness may not realize that he
or she is being "interviewed" or "investigated" since the interviewer may be
someone well-known to the witness. Where it is impossible to approach a
witness without arousing suspicions, the witness must be informed of the
purpose of the exercise and asked to cooperate; failure to cooperate will result
in social ostracism, an example of subtle coercion to secure compliance.
Four different interviewers interview each witness on separate occasions
to help compensate for the fact that neither party has the right to cross-
examine witnesses. That a witness may not realize that he or she is being
"interviewed" on one or more of the four occasions may also improve the
odds of catching inconsistent testimony. Once all the interviews are
193. The PFLP has broken ranks with the UNLU several times. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 48.
194. PFLP, Communiqu6 of Nov. 9, 1989 (on file with author).
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completed, the interviewers meet to compare reports. If there is any conflict
in the reports, witnesses are re-interviewed.1x5 This method of discovery
does not always work, and a committee must sometimes resort to alternative
methods to ascertain a witness' activity or reliability. For example, if it is
suspected that a party or a witness is an informant for the Israelis, the
committee will seek information on that person from the various political
groups.'96 Seeking opinions from the various factions lessens the likelihood
that one group can falsely accuse an individual. Once the process is
completed, the interviewers submit a full record of the interviews together
with any recommendations to representatives of the four judges on the
committee. This ensures that neither the investigators nor the parties know the
judges.
The parties directly involved are informed orally that they will receive a
decision within a stated number of days. If the committee of four is split
equally, then a new committee is appointed to begin the process again. 197
Hearsay has it that the local committees send specific files to PLO headquar-
ters in Tunis for decision. 9 ' When the committee (or the PLO) reaches a
decision, the parties are invited to attend a sulh gathering, a private
reconciliation proceeding. In keeping with customary practice, the parties,
their families, and respected persons in the neighborhood attend the gathering.
This group typically includes some or all of the interviewers and committee
members, but their capacity as participants in the legal process is not officially
recognized as it was in the past. Given the presence of a variable number of
community members who are not directly involved in the dispute, the identity
of the judges will not necessarily be obvious. At the meeting the victim and
his family formally state that their rights have been satisfied and that
differences between the two parties have been settled. 9 9 This process helps
ensure that no one takes the law into his or her own hands after the decision,
and engenders unity among the community.2 'c There is no mandatory right
of appeal, but the parties may ask the NRC to exercise its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction.2"'
195. Interviews with A, B, C and D, supra note 30.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Jerome M. Segal, Does the State of Palestine Exist?, J. PALESTiNE STUD., Autumn 1989, at
14, 18. If this is indeed the case, it is unclear how the local committees decide which files to send to
Tunis. It may be that local committees send certain especially serious matters, such as collaboration,
to Tunis on a routine basis, or that they send only deadlocked cases to Tunis. It is also possible that the
NRC may send all death penalty cases to Tunis to help prevent the summary execution of alleged
collaborators. In one instance the wrong individual was executed, and the UNLU issued a public
apology.
199. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30; HUNTER, supra note 6, at 132 (noting use
of sulh gatherings in Gaza during intifada).
200. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30.
201. Id.
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The mediation process that has developed during the intifada is consistent
with theories that characterize mediation as a process which invokes the
parties' belief systems.2 °' According to one theory, the likelihood of
successful mediation depends on five factors."ra Palestinian society during
the intifada satisfies most of these factors. Palestinians hold many common
principles; for example, status, honor, and prestige in the community remain
more important to most Palestinians than the achievement of individual justice
at all costs. Parties prefer to settle their disputes in a private forum because
they find court appearances even more dishonorable than mediation. In
addition, Palestinians are extremely alienated from the Israeli-run civil courts.
Finally, the intimate nature of Palestinian communities and Palestinians'
inability to travel freely outside the Territories mean that Palestinian families
must deal with each other on a recurring basis.
Mediation therefore has a number of advantages. It handles grievances
therapeutically by allowing the free ventilation of anger and frustration in a
manner consistent with Palestinian tradition. During the turbulent times of the
intifada, mediation is readily accessible, quick, and inexpensive. It helps
equalize and realign status, thus promoting the more egalitarian ethic for
which the intifada strives. It assists in re-establishing and confirming an
individual's sense of belonging to the community. Moreover, the agreements
reached are "enforceable through informal social control, and [have]
legitimacy through community consensus."2"4 Societal pressure and coercion
from family, friends, and the community have traditionally been very strong,
and are even stronger during the intifada; for whatever reason, people usually
comply with agreements. °'
Despite its positive aspects, the failure of the mediation process to comply
with international standards of justice is a significant problem. When
questioned about the fact that an accused cannot defend himself in person,
know the evidence against him, confront witnesses, or know the judges,
202. See, e.g., Wrrrv, supra note 26, at 10 (discussing factors and beliefs conclusive to mediation,
including (1) some degree of on-going personal interaction between parties; (2) willingness of both
parties to settle in private forum; (3) willingness of both parties to express personal wants and needs;
(4) shared cultural or community identity between parties; (5) belief that intangible social resources such
as status, honor, prestige, and personal satisfaction are as important as or more important than tangible
resources such as money, property, or land; and (6) belief that reaching an agreement is more important
than determining absolute right or wrong).
203. These are (1) the quantitative intensity and number of principles in a community; (2) the
political and cultural distance from legal institutions (the greater the alienation, the greater the possibility
of mediation); (3) the amount of social stratification (the more equal the parties and the less
differentiated the community in terms of status and economic power, the greater the possibility of
mediation); (4) the presence of or desire for on-going social relationships; (5) the greater the range and
integration of local distribution and leadership networks, the more pervasive and strong mediation is
likely to be. Id. at 20-24.
204. Id. at 4.
205. Interviews with A, B, C and D, supra note 30.
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several interviewees responded that these rules were an effective way to avoid
exposing those involved in the process to the Israelis or their informants.' 6
Nonetheless, these violations of commonly accepted human rights norms2°
cannot be condoned. One partial way to balance human rights concerns with
the real danger of exposure to the Israelis might be to permit the accused to
know and challenge the evidence. The committee could provide the accused
with a written report and allow a response, while keeping the mediators,
interviewers, and witnesses unknown. Another partial solution would be to
make more systematic use of the public personalities in intifada mediation.
They have a great deal of legitimacy given their public role in the Palestinian
struggle, and are already well known to everyone, Israelis included. This has
already occurred to some extent." 8
The intifada mediation process is thus an altered and updated version of
traditional Palestinian legal procedures, a fact that contributes to its
legitimacy. Mediation is an effective dispute resolution procedure which helps
build greater Palestinian solidarity through mutual non-compliance with Israeli
institutions. However, the failure of intifada mediation to comply with
international standards of justice is extremely troubling. Secrecy can
contribute to inadequate fact-finding and mistaken results; in addition, it may
encourage some Palestinians to use mediation to settle personal grudges.
Moreover, while the Palestinians do not yet have a state that can openly run
a justice system in compliance with international standards, there are a
number of reasons why their interim arrangements should comply with
international standards to the greatest degree possible. One is normative:
procedural due process is quite simply that for which the late twentieth-
century world and its inhabitants strive, or for which they should strive. A
second is more practical: it makes sense to set up the best possible system
now to simplify any eventual transition. A third is purely pragmatic: reports
of injustices committed in the name or course of the intifada undermine the
strength and breadth of international support for the Palestinian cause. For all
of these reasons, complying with international standards should be a goal of
the intifada.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art.
14(3), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368, 372 (1967) ("[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality .... (d)... to
defend himself in person ... (e) [t]o examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him. .. ").
Some Americans may also question the lack of a jury. As with most of the world, however, none
of the legal traditions the intfada utilizes includes juries. BIsHARAT, supra note 28, at 112. Moreover,
the committee system itself is somewhat analogous to a jury or arbitration panel, and is at least an
improvement over entrusting verdicts to a single anonymous judge.
208. For example, Faisal Husseini mediates disputes involving family matters, blood feuds, and
accusations of collaboration. WALLACH & WALLACH, supra note 116, at 71.
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VII. RULES
Since the beginning of the intifada various Palestinian institutions, notably
the UNLU, have issued directives that include rules for behavior and dispute
settlement. Overall, compliance with these directives has been problematic and
far from universal. While areas such as labor law exhibit the UNLU's ability
to legislate effectively, women's rights and legal penalties demonstrate that the
legitimacy and coercive power of the UNLU leadership is not absolute.
Furthermore, the directives themselves sometimes fail to conform to
international human rights standards for accused wrongdoers and women. This
is especially troubling in light of Palestinian calls for Israel to respect these
same international standards.
The primary source of rules are the UNLU communiqu6s and leaflets
called bayanat.2° The Palestinian people generally treat the directives and
their rules as law: "[the bayanat] are like the Koran to the people, to the
youths. When they arrive in the villages they are studied, discussed.., they
are our constitution."21 The Israelis clearly recognize the importance of
these documents, and have made numerous attempts to find the printing
presses,21' to arrest UNLU members who allegedly authored the
bayanat,212 and to issue false UNLU leaflets. 23 The Shin Bet, the Israeli
equivalent of the FBI, produces fake bayanat "to give the impression of
divisions amongst the leadership with the aim of spreading confusion and
despondency amongst the wider Palestinian public. "214 In addition to the
UNLU communiqu6s, local committees, individual political factions, women's
groups, and others have also issued leaflets. These bayanat supplement UNLU
directives, indicate the issuers' perspectives on various issues,215 and
209. Translations of 1988 Communiquds Nos. 1 through 29 appear in INTIFADA: THE PALESTNIAN
UPRIsING, supra note 1, at 327-94. For an analysis of Communiqu6s Nos. 1 through 13 and others, see
Abu-Amr, supra note 29, at 389-93. For a description of the process of drafting the early communiquds,
see ISRAEL'S TmnD FRONT, supra note 8, at 194-95. There is no complete collection of the bayanat
in English; such a collection would be of great help to scholars who want to study the legal structures
developed during the intifada.
In addition to the bayanat, rules also come from contracts, judicial decisions, and mediation
settlements.
210. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 25.
211. PERETz, supra note 146, at 92.
212. ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 215 (discussing March 19, 1988 seizure of UNLU
leaders writing bayan No. 11).
213. See RIGBY, supra note 9, at 34; Daoud Kuttab, The Palestinian Uprising: The Second Phase,
Self-Sufficiency, J. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1988, at 36, 38-39; Salim Tamari, Eyeless in Judea:
Israel's Strategy of Collaborators and Forgeries, MIDDLE E. REP., May-Aug. 1990, at 39, 42
[hereinafter Tamari, Eyeless].
214. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 34.
215. Jamal R. Nassar & Roger Heacock, The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians
Under Occupation, in CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 191, 196. (stating that each of the four principal
groups which comprise the UNLU has issued leaflets defining its policies on issues such as slogans, the
frequency of general strikes, and the pace of movement toward civil disobedience).
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occasionally list timetables for events and actions.216
The job of writing the general communiques rotates among the four main
political groups in the UNLU. After jointly deciding upon the basic points,
one to four middle-level cadres write a draft that then circulates for comments
and changes.217 The communiqu6s have a regular format. They contain
political guidelines, practical instructions, and action agendas which local
popular committees and individuals are to implement.218 Each one opens
with a preamble laying out the PLO's political position,219 followed by
operative sections containing directives for the community for a two- to three-
week period. The UNLU issued double leaflets four or five times in the first
two years of the intifada; these occasions may have indicated important policy
differences between different factions in the UNLU. The UNLU secretly
prints the communiqu6s and distributes them widely in a variety of ways,"
including radio broadcasts from various Arab countries.' The UNLU has
even used facsimiles transmit the communiqu6s abroad.'
The communiqu6s have called for a wide variety of domestic actions,
including comprehensive strikes,' organization of popular teaching,'
resignation of civil and municipal employees, 6 boycotting of Israeli goods
and taxes, 7 and sit-ins and marches." Communiqu6 No. 38 instructed
the Palestinians not to use firearms against the Israelis; this directive limited
fighting in the beginning of the intifada primarily to stone-throwing. 9 The
216. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 26.
217. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, The Revolutionary Transfonnation of the Palestinians
Under Occupation, in CROSSROADS, supra note 8, at 197; see also HUNTER, supra note 6, at 76.
218. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 30.
219. ARONSON, supra note 69, at 331; Miller at al., supra note 110, at 40; RIGBY, supra note 9,
at 30.
220. Jon Immanuel, 'Moderate'Intifada Leaflet Indicates InternalDispute, JERUSALEM POST, Feb.
26, 1991 available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intl file (discussing appendices to leaflet no. 67). Rigby
discusses two versions of Communiqu6 No. 10, RIGBY, supra note 9, at 20. There were two versions
of Communiqu6 No. 17 as well, one of which the PFLP issued calling for a campaign of total civil
disobedience. Id. at 21.
221. For methods of distribution see PERETz, supra note 146, at 92; ISRAEL'S THIRD FRONT, supra
note 8, at 209-10.
222. COBBAN, supra note 31, at 72 (noting broadcasts from Syria and Iraq).
223. For example, the author was present in December 1989 when the Washington convention of
a charitable Palestinian organization received Communiqu6 No. 49 over the hotel facsimile machine.
224. See, e.g., INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 328 (citing UNLU
Communiqu6 No. 1, Jan. 1, 1988).
225. INTIFADA: THm PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 338 (citing UNLU Communiqu6No.
9, Feb. 1988).
226. INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 333-34, 344-45 (citing UNLU
Communiqu6 No. 6, Feb. 2, 1988 and UNLU Communiqu6 No. 13, Apr. 10, 1988).
227. INTIFADA: THE PALESTIIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 353-55 (citing UNLU Communiqu6
No. 17, May 24, 1988); Ann Grace, The Tax Resistance atBayt Sahur, J. PALESTINIAN STUD., Winter
1990, at 99, 99.
228. INTiFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 360, 362-63 (citing UNLU
Communiqu6 No. 19, June 9, 1988).
229. Communiqu6 No. 38, Mar. 1989, called for the use of knives, axes, and Molotov cocktails,
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sight of Palestinian youths throwing stones at Israelis armed with Uzi machine
guns generated substantial sympathy from the international community.20
In the international arena, the communiqu6s have called for Israel to withdraw
from Palestinian and Arab lands occupied in 1967, to dismantle settlements
in the Occupied Territories, to place the Occupied Territories under United
Nations supervision for a limited time, and to convene an international
conference under United Nations auspices.?'
The UNLU has occasionally retracted its own rules. For example, in June
1989 the UNLU called upon Gazan men not to use the new computerized
identification cards that permitted them to travel to Israel to work. Strike
forces were told to confiscate the cards prior to use. However, the proposed
rule apparently exceeded what the UNLU could legitimately require of the
Gazan workforce, which was economically dependent on access to Israel.
Gazan workers were willing to make the economic sacrifices represented by
boycotts and strike days, but not this near-total sacrifice; as a result, the
UNLU eventually retracted the rule. 2 Ironically, while issuing the rule
may have threatened the UNLU's legitimacy, retracting the rule probably
strengthened it. "Although this could be seen as a defeat for the [UNLU], the
very fact that it was prepared to acknowledge the mistakes and retreat from
untenable positions reinforced its image as an authentic leadership that was
willing to respond to pressures from below."" 3
The following sections survey selected legal rules that have appeared in
the UNLU bayanat and other rule-making pronouncements.
A. Landlord Tenant Relations
One area the bayanat have addressed is landlord-tenant law. Rents in the
West Bank are paid in Jordanian dinar; by 1989 the unfavorable exchange rate
between the Jordanian dinar and the Israeli shekel had pushed rents to
prohibitive levels. 4 Thus, in 1989 the UNLU issued a, call for all Palestin-
but not firearms. Sayigh, supra note 96, at 39 n.38; Gene Sharp, The lntifada and Nonviolent Struggle,
J. PALESTINE STnD., Autumn 1989, at 3, 3. Since the start of the intifada, perhaps 85% of the total
resistance has been nonviolent. Sharp, supra, at 3. In September 1988, Israeli Defence Minister Rabin
estimated 80% of the violence involved stone throwing, the rest involving Molotov cocktails, assaults,
and violent demonstrations. RIGy, supra note 9, at 56.
230. ISRAEL'S THIRD FRoNT, supra note 8, at 31. The use of weapons has increased dramatically
since the Gulf Crisis; this has resulted in a loss of sympathy from the international community. See infra
notes 336-343 and accompanying text.
231. INriPADA: TBE PALESrINlAN UPRIsING, supra note 1, at 380-81 (citing UNLU Communiqu6
No. 26, Sept. 27, 1988).
232. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 31.
233. Id.
234. Exchange rates quoted in Mouin Rabbani, lntifada Profiles: Narratives of a Small Proprietor
and a Fugitive, J. PAL.ESIN STUD., Spring 1990, at 89, 91. Landlord-tenant rules have generally been
frozen in their pre-occupation status, thus creating many problems. BisHARAT, supra note 28, at 136.
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ian landlords to reduce rents by twenty-five percent. 5 While landlords in
Northern West Bank cities such as Tulkarem, Jenin, and Qalqilya widely
obeyed this bayan, others did not do so. Ramallah landlords began to demand
full rent in dollars." One popular committee interpreted the UNLU bayan
as requiring a reduction only if rent was over 250 dinars, while another
committee asked that the bayan apply only to leased shops, not to home rental
property. 7 While these deviations from the UNLU directive may constitute
honest attempts to interpret an unclear bayan, they more likely represent
instances in which communities had to compromise for fear of landlord
retaliation. This indicates that all sectors of the Palestinian community do not
regard the UNLU as a legitimate legislator for all issues. Non-compliance also
indicates the limits of the UNLU's coercive ability.
B. Strikes
From the beginning of the intifada, UNLU rule-making has focused on the
regulation of total and partial strikes that are intended to signal a rejection of
Israeli control of the Palestinian economy." Each communiqu6 provides a
schedule of strikes. 9 To alleviate the economic distress felt by Palestinian
shopkeepers, the UNLU issued a bayan in January 1988 that permitted shops
to open for three hours a day on non-strike days.2' While a minority of
shopkeepers had to be warned by masked shabab to keep their stores closed,
a majority obeyed the UNLU directives voluntarily.24 This demonstrates the
UNLU's high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of most Palestinians, and also
a degree of effective authority that the Israelis resented and feared. In the
early days of the strikes the Israeli government attempted to reassert its
authority over the Palestinians by having soldiers force shop owners to keep
their shops open, or by having soldiers weld shut the doors of those whose
owners refused to follow their orders.242 However, the Palestinians repaired
the damage and continued to close their shops on strike days. The Israelis
abandoned their efforts to break the strikes after four months.243 By mid-
May 1988 Palestinians closed their stores in compliance with UNLU bayanat
with little interference from the Israeli army.2' In many ways this repre-
235. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 213; Ali Jarbawi, The Geography of the Intifada, MIDDLE E. REP.,
May-Aug. 1990, at 21, 23.
-236. Jarbawi, supra note 235, at 23.
237. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 214.
238. Id. at 108.
239. COBBAN, supra note 31, at 72; Sayigh, supra note 96, at 32.
240. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 110.
241. Id. at 109-10.
242. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 30.
243. IsRAEL's THIRD FRONT, supra note 8, at 141; see also McDOwALL, supra note 45, at 8.
244. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 112. For discussion of the intifada's abandonment of its frequent-
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sents a victory of UNLU legitimacy over Israeli coercive force.
C. Labor Relations
The Jordanian labor law of 1965245 officially governs in the West Bank,
although even prior to the intifada it was outdated,2' superseded in Jordan
itself, and in many instances superseded by Israeli military orders in the
Occupied Territories.247 As part of the intifada's drive to give Palestinians
more control over their own lives, the UNLU has issued several communiqu6s
on labor relations. One urged factory owners not to deduct employees'
salaries on strike days, and to compensate their workers for the increased cost
of living and the decline in the value of the dinar.2" Another called for
employers to raise wages by forty percent.249 The UNLU also has noted that
unions play a useful role by mediating disputes, and has issued warnings to
Palestinian employers not to fire union organizers.2Y0
The widespread belief generated by the intifada that all Palestinians must
work together has contributed to an increased incidence of private labor
agreements between Palestinian employers and Palestinian employees. Prior
to the intifada written labor agreements were rare,"s but more factories
have entered into written agreements with their workers since the intifada
began. The Palestinian employees union, the General Federation of Trade
Unions (GFTU),2  and Palestinian employers have negotiated labor
contracts, including several in the first year of the intifada. 3 The first
major negotiations at a Palestinian-owned factory were those at the Royal
Crown Cola bottling plant in Ramallah in August 1988. The resulting contract
strike policy in the post-Gulf War period, see infra notes 351 -357 and accompanying text.
245. This law is available in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, LABOR LAW AND PRAcTIcE IN THE
HASHEMrrE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, BLS Rep. No. 322 (1967) [hereinafter 1965 Jordanian Labor Law].
246. The law does not provide a minimum wage, id. at 37, does not provide for paid sick leave
(except for that under Worker's Compensation), id. at 46, and sets overtime only at the level of time
and one quarter of regular wage, id. See generally HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 90.
247. See, e.g., HENDY, supra note 61, at 12 (discussing Military Order No. 825). The labor unions
have begun looking at the possibility of developing a new labor law. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at
191,206.
248. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 183.
249. Id.
250. Id. Unfortunately there is no information available concerning the extent of obedience with
these bayanat.
251. MCDOWALL, supra note 45, at 107, 281 n.39.
252. There have been three employees' federations, all calling themselves GFTU. HILTERMANN,
supra note 89, at 190-91. In 1989, the GFTU had more than 100,000 West Bank members in ninety
trade unions. 1989 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 106, at 1443. The unions have become very active
during the intifada. McDoWALL, supra note 45, at 107; Joost R. Hiltermann, Worker's Rights During
the Uprising, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1989, at 83, 85.
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granted workers an eight-hour day and pay for UNLU strike days. 25 4 By the
end of 1989 most contracts eschewed the 1965 Jordanian Labor Law in favor
of "a sense of what [was] fair, evolving from a dialogue between employers
and unions, encouraged by the UNLU." 5
Three contracts negotiated in late 1989 represent this shift. The first is the
Solh Carpentry contract of November 1, 1989.6 This contract guaranteed
time-and-a-half for overtime and set a minimum wage of JD80 (Jordanian
dinar) per month, with the JD set at 4.6 New Israeli Shekels (U.S. $2.30).
Since neither the 1965 Jordanian Labor Law nor Israeli military law set a
minimum wage, the minimum wage standard was a significant achieve-
ment. 7 The Solh Carpentry contract provided health coverage and twenty-
three paid vacation days, including Palestinian Independence Day. The
agreement also addressed the unique circumstances posed by the intifada. It
set the minimum number of workdays per month at twenty-two, but provided
that employees would be paid if they worked less than twenty-two days
because of UNLU strikes or military curfew. The employer and employees
split the cost of the remaining eight days." A unique provision provided
half salary for three months for anyone arrested; since arrest is a daily
possibility for virtually every Palestinian worker, this clause was essential. In
addition, the contract obligated the employer to place matching amounts in a
contingency fund every month for additional payments to jailed workers.
The second, which may become a prototype for collective bargaining
agreements during the intifada, was the November 12, 1989 contract between
Silvana Factory and the General Union of Workers in Food Industries, part
of the GFTU.?19 This contract contained a number of features not present
in the Solh Carpentry agreement. An unprecedented feature was the
equalization of salaries for men and women, 260 a victory won on the last day
of negotiation. 26 1 Also new was an employer monthly contribution to the
company credit union. 262 The terms provided thirty paid days of leave per
254. HiLTERMANN, supra note 89, at 182.
255. Id. at 189.
256. Collective Work Agreement in Solh Carpentry, Nov. 1, 1989 (on file with author).
Hiltermann discusses other 1989 contracts and is an excellent source for discussion of the labor
movement. HILTanmA.N, supra note 89.
257. 1989 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 252, at 88.
258. This provision seems to mean that the employer pays the cost for half of the days missed
beyond the 22-day minimum working month.
259. Collective Bargaining Agreement between Silvana Factories and General Union of Workers
in Food Industries, Nov. 12, 1989 (on file with author) [hereinafter Collective Bargaining Agreement].
260. HILTERMANN, supra note 101, at 189.
261. The contract set a new minimum wage of JD80. The company had argued for wages of JD60
for women and JD80 for men, even though they did the same work. Prior to the contract 25% of the
men and 95 % of the women had earned under JD80. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 259.
The union negotiating team included a woman.
262. The procedures for using this credit union are unclear.
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year and up to fourteen days of pay in the case of layoffs; previously these
days had been unpaid. The contract prohibited arbitrary dismissal and required
negotiations between the employer and the workers' committee in order to
dismiss a worker. Other provisions agreed upon, but not written into the
contract, included a holiday on Palestinian Independence Day and a
commitment to continue paying the salaries of imprisoned workers for an
unspecified length of time; prior to the contract, a worker imprisoned for
more than two months lost his or her job. Since Silvana is the single largest
factory in the West Bank, many viewed this contract as a victory for the labor
movement in the Occupied Territories.263
The third contract is the November 27, 1989 agreement between the
Ramallah Brick Factory and the Union of Brickmakers, Stonecutters, and
Tilemakers." This contract is noteworthy because it sets the highest
minimum wage, JD130. It made all workers regular employees rather than
daily workers, and set minimum yearly raises at five percent. Workers unable
to reach work for reasons beyond their control, such as strikes, sieges, or
curfews, received full wages for the first four days, and half wages
thereafter. 265
While many of the new provisions in these contracts probably would have
been negotiated eventually even without the intifada, the uprising has
energized the labor movement to demand them sooner and more vociferously.
The intifada has brought a sense of common struggle and a greater sense of
solidarity to the Palestinian community which is reflected in these labor
contracts. In addition, the more progressive provisions of some of these
contracts, such as equal pay for women, may contribute to a further change
in traditional community values.
D. Women's Rights
During the intifada women have made small strides towards increased
rights and status, but have also suffered important setbacks. On the positive
side, women's groups, justice committees, and individual women have begun
to give advice on spousal quarrels or potential divorces for the first time.
Professor Philippa Strum provides an example. When a husband in the 'Aqbet
Jabir refugee camp refused to permit his wife to find a new job or to
participate in the women's groups, she consulted a committee (it is unclear
what type of committee) concerning her desire to leave him. The committee
263. At the time, the Silvana Factory employed 314 workers, including 65 women. Collective
Bargaining Agreement, supra note 259.
264. Contract Between Ramallah Brick Factory and Unioh of Brickmakers, Stonecutters, and
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encouraged her, and when her spouse threatened to take their children, the
committee told her to go to the sharia court to obtain custody. Knowing she
would not go to the Israeli police for enforcement, the husband said he would
ignore any court order. The committee, however, assured her that local
popular committees would enforce the court's decisions. 66 In this incident,
then, one of the new intifada institutions acted in a way that both acknowl-
edged its belief in the continuing legitimacy of tradition in the form of the
sharia court, and marked a break with tradition by intervening in a domestic
situation and by implicitly approving of and encouraging a woman's right to
work and be active outside the home. Women's committees also have started
to give lectures about personal status and divorce law.267 One women's
committee attempted to draft a more egalitarian family status law to replace
the traditional laws governing divorce, inheritance, and other matters that
favor men over women.268
Women's groups have also tried to regulate or eliminate the bride price
(mahr). Since many men have been unable to work, in a consistent fashion
during the intifada, they have been unable to raise the large sums customarily
required.269 Breaking with tradition, some committees have encouraged
couples to refuse to have the male pay mahr on the grounds that payment for
women is a burdensome custom that is not compatible with the goals of the
intifada in improving the status of women.270 The custom may, however,
have been in decline even before the intifada. In some areas, such as refugee
camps, inhabitants had already all but abandoned mahr both because families
were too poor and because the women may have found the custom humiliat-
ing. 271
Despite these few strides, the intifada has not been successful in
eradicating traditional Palestinian notions of women's role in society. By the
third year of the uprising, there had been no permanent change in women's
social and political position.272 On the contrary, Islamic fundamentalist
266. PHIHPA STRUM, THE WOMEN ARE MARCHING: THE SECOND SEX AND THE PALESTNAN
REVOLUTION 150 (1992). Unfortunately there is no available information on the final result of this
dispute.
267. Hiltermann, The Woman's Movement, supra note 120, at 56.
268. loost R. tHiltermann, Trade Unions and Women's Committees, supra note 163, at 36. The
Jordanian Personal Status law of 1976 is the applicable family law in-the West Bank; it incorporates
many Islamic principles. STRUM, supra note 266, at 226. Among the elements that favor men is the
continued provision for polygamy. Lynn Welchman, The Development of Islamic Family Law in the
Legal System of Jordan, 37 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 868, 883-84 (1988). The committee to reform family
status law included attorney Mona Rishmawi, academic Rita Giacaman, and another attorney
knowledgeable about sharia law; it met only twice before the Gulf War Crisis interfered with plans to
offer a course on women in Jordanian law. STRUM, supra note 266, at 226-27.
269. Darweish, supra note 63, at 56.
270. K=rTY WARNOCK, LAND BEFORE HONOUR: PALEsTINIAN WOMEN IN THE OCCUPIED
TERrroREs 63 (1990).
271. Id. at 61.
272. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 193.
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groups have in fact attempted to restrict women's options in the name of
creating a Palestinian society. An important illustration of this phenomenon
was the h/ab (headscarf) campaign. In Gaza, Hamas and other traditionalists
organized a social and political effort to impose the hijab on almost all
women. Wearing a veil became a sign of political commitment to the intifada,
cultural struggle, and national heritage.273 Many inhabitants regarded those
women who refused to wear a veil, primarily leftist activists, as "vain,
frivolous, or anti-nationalist," and some men attacked them with graffiti,
insults, or even stones.274
The situation worsened in August 1989 when a group of shabab threatened
two activist women who had only recently. donned the h/ab, telling them that
their heads were not completely covered. One woman said she would protect
herself, and began to unzip her bag, claiming possession of a knife. The
attackers shouted to a crowd that the women were collaborators and had a
tape recorder in the bag. The crowd chased the women into a shop and
searched the bag. The men dispersed when no recorder was found.
The women notified the shabab's local committee who apprehended one
of the men who had instigated the incident. 75 A justice committee sentenced
them to pay a fine of JD3000 ($4500) to the women and their families.276
The next UNLU communiqu6 condemned "attacks by radical groups on
Palestinian women in Jerusalem, Hebron and Gaza."2' An appendix to the
communiqu6 elaborated the UNLU's view of the role of women in the
intifada:
Woman as we perceive her, besides being a mother, daughter, sister or wife, is an
effective human being and full citizen with all rights and responsibilities ....
4) The phenomenon of harassing women contradicts the traditions and norms of our
society as well as our accepted attitudes about women. At the same time it
denigrates the patriotism and humanity of each female citizen.
5) Nobody has the right to accost women and girls in the street on the basis of
their dress or the absence of a headscarf.
6) The Unified National Leadership will chase these hooligans and will stop such
immature and unpatriotic actions, especially when it is found that many such
hooligans consistently engage in their own suspicious activities.27
While item four embodies traditional Palestinian values, items five and six
represent distinct changes. Patriotic graffiti appeared soon after the UNLU
issued this communiqu6, proclaiming "those caught throwing stones at women
273. Rema Hammami, Women, the Hiab, and the Intfada, MIDDLE E. REP., May-Aug. 1990,
at 24, 26.
274. Id. at 24.
275. Id. at 26-27.
276. Id. at 27.
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will be treated as collaborators."279 In a demonstration of the legitimacy and
penetrative ability of UNLU rules, the atmosphere changed dramatically in a
few days "and women without headscarves no longer felt so threatened. Few
men dared tell a woman to cover her head, and those who did could be
accused of considering themselves greater than the Unified Leadership."28
The way the new intifada institutions referred to both customary norms
and to new norms espousing women's equality when handling this h/ab
incident has both positive and negative implications for women's status. On
the positive side, the UNLU defined attacks on women as a political and
social crime. However, some women felt that "the [use of a] sulh only feeds
into traditional conceptions of women by bringing in the women's families and
treating the issue as a question of honor and the women not as political
individuals but as family property. "2 The hyab incident indicates continued
conflict between women's participation in the independence movement and
their participation in a broader women's rights movement. The UNLU has a
limited vision of women's political participation; women can participate, but
should not abandon their traditional role as sustainers. Hamas has an even
more limited vision: women belong in the home, suitably attired.2"2
While the UNLU bayan in the hyab incident supported women's rights,
other communiqu6s often marginalize women by referring to them in ways
that are traditional, patriarchal, and condescending.283 Participants in the
intifada are usually "our sons," "brother doctors," "brother workers," or
"brother businessmen and grocers."2" When the bayanat mention women,
it is usually as among the people "who are suffering" '285 or as "moth-
ers, "286 rather than as women in their own right. Some communiqu6s
exclude women altogether, despite the ongoing activity of the women's
committees. 27
Certain UNLU statements depart from this marginalizing pattern. For
example Communiqu6 No. 5 called on "mothers, sisters, and daughters to
work side by side with their husbands, sons, and brothers. '"288 In August
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a special responsibility in organizing sit-ins and other appropriate activities"
in solidarity with male and female prisoners."' Furthermore, the UNLU has
consistently recognized International Women's Day. In 1988, the UNLU
merely called for demonstrations on March 8 as part of its weekly
schedule,' but the following year it expressed its desire to "salute the
Palestinian woman" and declared its "admiration for her heroism in the
national struggle."291 The UNLU also urged "strengthening the unity of the
women's movement in the State of Palestine within the framework of the
Unified Women's Council. "292
Outside Palestinian leadership has exhibited the same pattern. The
Palestinian Declaration of Independence states that "[g]overnance will be
based on principles of social justice, equality, and nondiscrimination in public
rights on grounds of race, religion, color or sex."293 The document later
"render[s] special tribute to the brave Palestinian woman, guardian of
sustenance and life, keeper of our people's perennial flame.1 294 Joost
Hiltermann interprets the Declaration to mean that "the only roles assigned to
women in the new state are to protect, preserve, and procreate. "295 A
preferable interpretation, however, is that the Palestinian leadership, while
acknowledging women's current status, also genuinely aspires to the lofty
goals of equality.
Women activists have expressed concern about how to solidify and expand
the few gains women have made during the intifada so as to prevent a return
to traditional norms when the intifada is over.296 Some women's groups
have said that they "must participate in developing legislation and a
constitution, which will give women equal rights with men."297 Professor
Hanan Ashrawi has said that "there is an urgent and concentrated need to
crystallize a feminist perspective and ideology."298
Nevertheless, it has proven extremely difficult to eradicate traditionalist
tendencies. Despite the UNLU communiqu6 in the hijab incident, fundamen-
289. INTIFADA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 372 (citing UNLU Communiqu6 No.
23, Aug. 5, 1988).
290. Hiltermann, The Women's Movement, supra note 120, at 54.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Proclamation of the Independent Palestinian State, 19th Session of Palestine National Council,
Algiers, Nov. 15, 1988, reprinted in I=rDA: THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING, supra note 1, at 397-99.
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295. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 202.
296. Id. at 198. The newsletter of the Union of Palestine Working Women's Committees
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55 (citing The Intifada and the Role of Palestine Women, VOICE OF WOMEN, Sept. 1989, at 1).
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Women's Action Committees (DFLP) editorial, Mar. 1989). This is not Fatah's position.
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talists renewed the hyab campaign in February 1990, and attempted to impose
the filbaab (full length dress) as well.' By September 1990, Hamas
activists patrolled the Gaza streets looking for inappropriately attired women
and dousing them with vegetable dye as punishment.3" Women in parts of
the West Bank fear being attacked with stones and pelted with fruit." 1 In
June 1990, one female activist tried to explain the inability of the UNLU and
the women's committees to change the hjab campaign by saying, "[w]e
couldn't act earlier in Gaza, because the time was not right. The Intifada was
at its height, and we didn't want to create internal differences while fighting
the occupation .... It is late now to act against this religious coercion, but
not yet too late."302 However, the prognosis for change at that time was not
good. By mid-1990 it appeared that the UNLU and other nationalists were
unable, or perhaps unwilling, to counter the growing fundamentalist
tendency.3 °" It remains to be seen if the more progressive intifada leadership
will be able to curtail such fundamentalist pressures."° Given that increased
economic and political hardship divert attention from women's issues, it is
unlikely that women will be able to obtain any support for a vigorous feminist
agenda in the near future.
E. Penalties for Criminal and Tortious Conduct
Intifada penalties, particularly the execution of alleged collaborators, have
received much international attention and have been a cause of great concern
to intifada actors and the greater Palestinian community. Mediators, justice
committees, and the NRC impose penalties that derive from customary law,
including house arrest, curfews, beatings, fines or diya compensation to the
victim, probation, banishment from an area or from the Occupied Territories
altogether, execution," and forcing businesses to close for months." ° The
imposition of penalties is not always formally announced, although the fact
that a penalty has been imposed usually becomes obvious to all concerned.
Often, however, the person being punished does not know the exact nature of
the penalty; thus, for example, the length of a period of house arrest may not
be disclosed to the wrongdoer until the period is at an end. Palestinians justify
this practice by arguing that it ensures that potential wrongdoers do not
299. Hammami, supra note 273, at 28.
300. Roy, supra note 5, at 58, 65.
301. STRUM, supra note 266, at 222.
302. HILTERMANN, supra note 89, at 204.
303. Id. at 207.
304. The experience of Algerian women, whose roles did not change significantly after
independence, suggests that the likelihood for long-term success may be low. Id. at 216.
305. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30; Interview with J, supra note 30.
306. BisHARAT, supra note 28, at 41.
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become aware of standard penalties for particular types of wrongs. This
practice, in their eyes, is an effective deterrent."W
The treatment of suspected collaborators illustrates the nature of legitimacy
and coercion during the intifada particularly well. Bayan No. 11 declared
March 29, 1988 the "Day of Repentance," and asked collaborators to confess
and "return to the national consensus on pain of the punishment due to
them."3 °8 Coercive societal pressure, coupled with the fear of death and
perhaps even some genuine repentance, induced many informers to com-
ply." The mid-1988 resignation of Palestinian civil servants dealt another
blow to the Israeli intelligence network, since many of the informants were
civil servants.1  Israel turned to new recruitment, focusing on prisoners'
and people seeking assistance from the government. 2 By early 1989 this
policy had paid off, and the numbers of collaborators had risen again. 13
Most Palestinians hate the collaborators because they betray the nationalist
struggle. Following armed attacks on collaborators, the Israeli government
armed many of them; these collaborators assisted in army interrogations,
harassed, beat, and shot activists, extorted money, and vandalized
property. 1 4 These atrocities gave the majority of the population further
reason to hate collaborators and to coerce the collaborators into "repenting."
To discourage collaborators, the UNLU devised a graduated scale of
penalties in certain communities that ranged from social ostracism to physical
assaults and firebomb attacks on property; if all else failed, local leadership,
in consultation with outside leadership, passed a death sentence which was
executed by hit squads.3 15 The UNLU hoped this system would encourage
some individuals to repent and join the national struggle. However, the UNLU
was also aware of the propaganda value to the Israelis if the intifada could be
portrayed as a "politically coordinated terror campaign orchestrated by the
PLO to intimidate" the populace. 6 Nevertheless, by mid-1989 "[l]ocal
strike forces increasingly [took] matters into their own hands as judges and
executioners," and there was a dramatic increase in the numbers of Palestinian
307. Interviews with A, B, C, and D, supra note 30.
308. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 43.
309. Id.
310. Tamari, Eyeless, supra note 213, at 39-40.
311. Id. at 40-41 (describing entrapment methods in prisons).
312. Joost Hiltermann, Israel's Strategy to Break the Uprising, J. PMALsTiNE STUD., Winter 1990,
at 94-95 (hereinafter Hiltermann, Strategy]. (Government authorities asked applicants for permits -
especially family reunification permits - to collaborate in exchange for what they wanted).
313. Tamari, Eyeless, supra note 213, at 40-41.
314. Hiltermann, Strategy, supra note 312, at 95; see also Tamari, Eyeless, supra note 213, at 41
("By mid-summer (1989], bands of armed collaborators were roaming the territories, terrorizing
villagers and assisting the security forces in the arrest and interrogation of suspected activists.").
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collaborators slain by other Palestinians.317 Increasing frustration with the
lack of progress on the diplomatic front may have furthered resentment against
suspected collaborators.31 Palestinians knifed, bludgeoned, hacked to death,
or shot other Palestinians in broad daylight.319 Some of these attacks were
meant to decrease the numbers of collaborators and thus disrupt Israeli ability
to govern.32° Others may have been committed in connection with personal
or political disputes having nothing to do with collaboration.32' When ques-
tioned, Palestinians claimed that the victims had been given opportunities to
repent, that they had been given "due process," that all revolutions have to
deal harshly with collaborators,3 = or that since the UNLU could not control
all areas, unauthorized slayings were bound to happen.3" The UNLU and
others made continuing efforts to stem the violence. In October 1989 PLO
Chairman Arafat issued a special appeal to halt the slayings, but it had little
effect.324 Local reconciliation committees and traditional elders made an
effort to hear collaborator disputes, but they, too, were unable to stem the
executions .3' By the spring of 1990 more Palestinians were slain by other
Palestinians than by Israelis. 2
By the late summer of 1990, for the first time since the Uprising had begun, there
were signs of a serious undermining of the authority of the [UNLU]. Whilst
seeking to replace the Israeli state as the locus of political authority within the
occupied territories, the [UNLU] was finding it increasingly difficult to perform
that most fundamental of state functions - the maintenance of law and order. The
unauthorised slaying of alleged collaborators continued unabated, family and clan
feuds persisted, and theft and other forms of criminal activity increased.n 7
The situation has continued to deteriorate since the Gulf Crisis.328
It is impossible to know how often parties not authorized by the UNLU
or PLO impose penalties. That the intifada institutions cannot stop these
killings indicates a failure of their legitimacy and influence in the Territories,
as well as their inability to coerce those acting without their approval. These
failures have no doubt caused many Palestinians to question the intifada
decision-makers' ability to "govern." Others, however, point to the conditions
of the Occupation to excuse the UNLU's failure to control the violence; after
all, ultimate control of law and order remains in Israeli, not Palestinian,
317. Id.
318. Id. at 45.
319. HUNTER, supra note 6, at 203.
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328. See infra notes 358-359 and accompanying text.
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
hands. Nonetheless, if the situation is not to deteriorate into pure chaos, with
widespread violations of human rights and a consequent loss of international
support, the UNLU and PLO must continue to criticize and attempt to stop
punishments not authorized by the UNLU, PLO, or another organization with
relatively widespread legitimacy in the Territories.
Even those penalties imposed by the UNLU present a number of
significant problems. Punishments such as beatings or execution may comply
with customary or sharia law, and may even be regarded as legitimate by the
Palestinian people, but they do not comply with modern international stan-
dards of justice. Similarly, banishment must be condemned in the same
fashion as Israeli deportations are condemned. In addition, the secrecy
surrounding penalties must be rethought. However useful secrecy may be, a
system in which potential offenders have no idea of the sanction for violating
societal norms does not comply with international standards.329 Publication
of a criminal code in the bayanat would address this problem by informing all
Palestinians of the sanctions against certain behavior, and by encouraging
uniformity in application of penalties. Overall, as with norms surrounding
trials,330 the intifada leadership should strive to meet international penal
standards to the limited extent it can, in order to achieve the normative goal
of complying with human rights standards and the practical goals of
maintaining order and retaining international sympathy.
The intifada leadership has responded to changing circumstances by
issuing new rules for behavior in a number of contexts. Popular compliance
with some of the new rules, such as certain rules governing landlord/tenant
relations and labor relations, indicates both the legitimacy of the rule-makers
and their coercive power. However, non-compliance with other crucial rules,
notably those regarding penalties, indicates that both the legitimacy and
coercive power of the rule-makers may be deteriorating. If the UNLU is
unable to respond to and resolve these difficulties, which have worsened
considerably during the Gulf Crisis, it risks losing what legitimacy it may still
have in the eyes of the Palestinian population.
VIII. THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT
The Palestinians' support for Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf
Crisis and its consequences for the Palestinians under occupation have
occasioned a fundamental shift in the nature of the intifada that, in turn, may
be affecting significantly the embryonic legal processes discussed thus far.
329. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 207, at 372 ("any
judgment rendered in a criminal case... shall be made public").
330. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for noncompliance with
international standards and normative and practical problems of noncompliance).
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During and after the crisis, several calamities befell the Palestinian
community. The Israeli Military Government put the entire Occupied
Territories under curfew for extended periods, which forced a slowdown in
the intifada.33' The PLO's disastrous support of Saddam Hussein33 2
resulted in a major loss of support from Western sympathizers, Israeli peace
activists, and Arab governments, which eliminated or lessened direct payments
to the PLO at the same time that remittances from Palestinians working in the
Gulf dropped considerably.333 After the war, the restored Emirate's tragic
expulsion of the majority of the Palestinian community in Kuwait resulted in
monetary problems for family members in the Occupied Territories, and an
influx of refugees into Jordan.334 In early March 1991, the Israelis instituted
a pass system that restricted Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market and
resulted in rising unemployment.3 Tensions mounted in the Territories, and
the tenor of the intifada shifted considerably.
Palestinian rage and despair caused the intifada to take a more violent
turn. When the intifada resumed after Israel lifted the curfew, hostile
tendencies that the UNLU had previously suppressed flared; the UNLU did
not sanction the violence, but was hard pressed to contain it. By August 1991,
Palestinians' use of firearms and grenades against Israeli troops had
increased.336 This violence also resulted in random attacks on Israeli
civilians and Palestinians presumed to be collaborators.337 Masked shabab
331. Don Peretz, The Impact of the Gulf War on Israeli and Palestinian Political Attitudes, J.
PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1991, at 17, 18 [hereinafter, Peretz, GulfWar]. The economic damage due
to curfew has been huge: projected losses for 1991 were $600 million in an economy that had an
estimated GNP of $2.4 billion in 1988. Id. at 19; see also Jon Immanuel, Cuifew Taking Toll on Areas'
Economy, JERUSALEM PosT, Feb. 14, 1991, available on LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file. During the
war the UNLU, Hamas, and other groups issued a few bayanat. See, e.g., Jon Immanuel, Boy Shot
Dead in Ramallah, JERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file
(describing PFLP and DPLP leaflets calling on people to side with Iraq if war broke out); Jon
Immanuel, Callfor Intifada Escalation, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 18, 1991, available on LEXIS, Nexis
library, Intl file (describing appendix to Communiqu6 No. 67 calling for escalation of intifada).
332. Some PLO members felt that the organization had no choice but to support Iraq because the
masses overwhelmingly did so; siding against Iraq could have delegitimized the PLO in many
Palestinians' eyes. Lamnis Andoni, The PLO at the Crossroads, J. PALESTINE STUD., Autumn 1991, at
54, 56.
333. Ziad Abu-Amr, Existing Structure, Quality of PLO Leadership May Not Be Able to Cope with
the New Phase, AL-FAiR, Mar. 11, 1991, at 8; Andoni, supra, note 332, at 54-56; Roy, supra note 5,
at 62.
334. Andoni, supra note 332, at 57.
335. RIGBY, supra note 9, at 16; Sharry Lapp, Aftermath: A Profile of Tlkarn Camp, MIDDLE
E. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 29.
336. Dan Izenberg, lntifada Turns to Guns, JERUSALEM POST (INT'L ED.), Aug. 3, 1991, at 3;
Alon Pinkas, Intifada: Biting the Bullet, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 9, 1991, at 35.
337. Faisal Husseini, Palestinian Politics After the Gulf War, An Interview with Faisal Husseini,
I. PALESTINE STUD., Summer 1991, at 99, 104; Jon Immanuel, Palestinians Gradually Returning to
Work, JERUSALEM POsT, Feb. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file; The Intifada at
the Crossroads, OTHER ISRAEL, (Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, Tel-Aviv, Israel), May-
June 1991, at 9 (knife attacks on random Israeli civilians individual actions, but killing collaborators
more systematic).
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
began robbing, attacking, kidnapping, and murdering victims. 338 Gangs such
as the Black Panthers (Fatah) engaged in increasingly violent activities against
the Israeli military and civilians. 339 During 1990-92, armed clashes between
Fatah, Hamas, and other factions injured many. 3" The UNLU called a
strike in 1991 to protest the internecine violence, the first strike for such a
purpose in the twenty-four years of occupation.34' Palestinian leaders
characterized this violent trend as "youthful unrest without ideological
meaning"342 perpetrated by "teenagers who know nothing about justice,"
which led one commentator to conclude that the "revolution is the phantom
starting to eat its own children. "343
Another manifestation of the increased tension was a growing dissatisfac-
tion with the earlier intifada power structure. Particularly significant was the
rise in popular influence of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas. The
Hebron Chamber of Commerce's June 1991 election of six Hamas
sympathizers to its eleven-member board was a symbol of disenchantment
with the UNLU. 3 4 Many Palestinians have observed strikes called by
Hamas, and llamas has imposed several general strikes despite pleas from the
UNLU not to do so. 45 On the other hand, the UNLU and Hamas have
attempted to cooperate in some strikes; UNLU bayan No. 70 of May 1991
called on the people only to obey strikes called by the UNLU or Hamas.46
The retrenchment of efforts to improve women's status and rights is further
evidence of fundamentalism's increasing power. There has been a "reinforce-
ment of the family unit and the role of maternity to the detriment of the
political organization of women. 0'' The number of early marriages is
increasing and the average age of marriage has dropped from 21 to 17.34'
Some Palestinians have attacked coeducation and have called for single-sex
schools. 49 In addition, the h/ab campaigns have resumed, with some
338. Areas Terror Not Subsiding, JERUSALEM POST (INT'L ED.) May 4, 1991, at 3.
339. Daniel Williams, Next Step; Arab Revolt: From Rocks to Revenge, L.A. TimES, May 5, 1992,
at 4.
340. Peretz, Gulf War, supra note 331, at 21 (describing Fatah-Hamas clash).
341. Palestinians: and Now the Boomerang, ECoNOMIST, June 8, 1991, at 46.
342. Peretz, Gulf War, supra note 331, at 21 (quoting Palestinian journalist Daoud Kuttab).
343. Ion Immanuel, Palestinians Rethinking Intifada, JERUSALEM PosT, June 15, 1991, at 2.
344. Peretz, Gulf War, supra note 331, at 21.
345. EmadFraitekh, Intfada: Now the WarAmong the Palestinians, WASH. PosT, Nov. 24, 1991,
at C2.
346. UNLU Communiqu6 70, May 1991 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Jon
Immanuel, Bloody Week in Territories, JERUSALEM POST (INT'L ED.) May 25, 1991, at 3 (noting
UNLU ordered that Hamas strikes be observed).
347. Islah Ahd El Jawad, The lntifada and the Woman Question, Address before the Bisan Centre
Conference on Social Relations in the Family During the Intifada (1991), in Women and the Intifada,
INT'L VIEWPOINT, Oct. 28, 1991, at 20, 21.
348. See STRUM, supra note 266, at 228.
349. Tamari, Left, supra note 136, at 17.
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evidence of increasing success.350 In general, there are increased pressures
on women to assume a more traditional lifestyle.
The rise of Hamas marked a corresponding decrease in the relative
strength of the UNLU, evidenced by a failure to enforce strike days. Hard-
won coordination, unity, and legitimacy broke down as Palestinians stopped
obeying UNLU bayanat.35' For the first time, the inhabitants of Nablus did
not follow a strike called by a UNLU bayan in December 1991; in fact, store
owners beat an activist who tried to close shops. 352 This event was particu-
larly significant because Nablus is the hub of secular nationalism and the
largest city in the Occupied Territories. The shortage of UNLU activists to
enforce the strike, caused by continued Israeli security force arrests, may have
encouraged shop owners to defy the strike. This probably indicates that some
owners only complied previously out of fear of retribution, rather than from
an inherent belief in the legitimacy of the strikes. 5 3 It probably also
indicates that the shop owners have lost faith in the UNLU and will no longer
follow its edicts. The UNLU's failure to produce any concrete results to end
the occupation may have contributed to this result. Even before the October
1991 peace talks, the intifada had "lost its meaning for the shopkeepers and
merchants who financed and supported it in its most active stages. They no
longer know why they are striking, or on whose authority such instructions
are given."354 Once the talks began, many Palestinians came to view
constant strikes as economically disruptive and no longer necessary in light of
the international peace processY.3 5 Even before the UNLU reduced the
number of strike days in April 1992 some merchants had started keeping
shops open beyond the hours the UNLU permitted356 because of severe
economic hardship. 7
Another major challenge to the power structure and legitimacy of the
UNLU and PLO is the continued increase in the unauthorized killing of
collaborators. In response to this problem, in June 1991 the UNLU followed
a PLO order to issue a bayan that banned "all enlisted activists, regardless of
their affiliation, from resorting to killing or executing suspects," and branded
anyone who carried out such attacks as "a violator of the laws of the state of
Palestine [who would] be punished with an iron fist."358 Outside leadership
350. See supra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
351. Peretz, Gulf War, supra note 331, at 20.
352. Jon Immanuel, For the First Time, Nablus Ignores a UNLU Strike Call, JERUSALEM POST,
Jan. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file.
353. Id.
354. Geoffrey Aronson, Full Steam Ahead in the West Bank, J. PAxEs'rmm STrUD., Autumn 1991,
at 115, 118.
355. Id.
356. Ya'ari, supra note 7, at 16.
357. See Robert Weissman, The Economics of Occupation: Enforced Poverty in the West Bank and
Gaza, MULTINAT'L MoNITOR, Dec. 1991, at 27, 28.
358. Peretz, Gulf War, supra note 331, at 20; PLO Demands Halt to Killing of Informers, N.Y.
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publicly censured young activists for not following established guidelines for
executions. Senior PLO spokesperson Bassam Abu Sharif stated that the
guidelines required twice warning an alleged collaborator. If that individual
continued to collaborate, then he or she would be tried before a "court" of
local lawyers. A death sentence by that court would then be sent to Tunis for
authorization. 59 It is unclear how often these rules have been followed.
The increased influence of fundamentalism, the unauthorized killing of
collaborators, and unenforced strike days all indicate that the intifada
leadership's hold on the population weakened during the Gulf War crisis. This
loss of control was a source of great embarrassment to the Tunis leader-
ship."e To restore its waning legitimacy, the UNLU attempted to alleviate
social and economic pressure by taking actions such as permitting restaurants
to remain open all day. 6' In addition, Fatah leaders launched a public
campaign to get the masked shabab off the street. 62 These efforts to
reassert control illustrate the problems faced by the intifada leadership:
[W]hilst the economic situation could explain a part of the increasing lawlessness,
it was also linked to the declining ability of the leadership of the Uprising to
enforce its rulings and control the wilder acts of the gangs of masked youths. This
erosion of authority was linked in turn to the factionalism that had permeated the
popular committees, the very bodies which had constituted the organisational
infrastructure of the Uprising during the high point of the Intifada in the years up
to 1990.3
In this new phase of the intifada, the UNLU no longer enjoys the same degree
of legitimacy that it did in the period preceding the Gulf War. The hardships
caused by the Gulf War and the failure of the UNLU to meet popular
expectations have significantly changed the dynamics of the uprising.
A new leadership structure has emerged in certain locales that relies more
extensively on local committees linked with particular communities. An
example is the Nablus Qasbah (market), where in 1991 a five-person
committee of Fatah's Shabiba movement made executive and judicial
decisions with the cooperation of the community. 3" The committee's
TamS, Jan. 1, 1991, at 4. An Appendix to the Dec. 30, 1990 leaflet also forbade killing of suspected
informers. Yet at the same time a PFLP leaflet called for the use of all available means against soldiers,
settlers, and collaborators, indicating a lack of consensus within the UNLU. Jon Immanuel, Four
Palestinians Die in Fatah Day Clashes, JERUsALEM PosT, Jan. 2, 1991, at 1; Jon Immanuel, PLO
Killings Cut Off West Bank Palestinians, JERUSALEM PosT, Jan. 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
library, Intl file.
359. Stephen Hubbell, The P.L.O. Grapples With New Realities, NATION, Sept. 9, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Nation file.
360. Id.
361. Jon Immanuel, Palestinians Show Signs of Normalizing Daily Life, JERUSALEM POST (INT'L
ED.), May 4, 1991, at 3.
362. Ya'ari, supra note 7, at 16.
363. RiBY, supra note 9, at 16.
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executive tasks included enforcement of UNLU bayanat, particularly those
concerning strike days. The committee also issued licenses for taxis and street
vendors and arrested thieves. Its judicial functions included punishing
collaborators and drug dealers and intervening in family disputes. The
committee expressed pride that it had been able to stop collaborator killings
for ten months. Israeli television correspondent Ehud Ya'ari also reported on
bands of young people who fought Palestinian crime, collected taxes, and held
trials.36 Following some kind of public trial (how exactly the trial worked
is not clear), thieves received 150 lashes in public, "just like in Saudi Ara-
bia."366 The use of this traditional sharia punishment and the fact that Saudi
Arabia is proposed as a model represents a growth in the Islamic fundamental-
ist trend even among Fatah members. Recognizing the effectiveness of these
committees, the Israeli authorities told local merchants complaining of thefts
to "go to the shabiba."'367
To some extent, these new local committees have assumed the roles and
responsibilities the pre-Gulf War elites no longer exercise. Miscellaneous
bayanat that appeared in July and August 1991 expressed disenchantment,
accusing the PLO of corruption, inefficiency, and personal aggrandizement,
among other things.3"' The Gazans have expressed concern about the
breakdown in the pre-Gulf War legal decision-making process. "For them,
this means the breakdown of the internal system of proto-legal appeal, dispute
mediation, and social protection that emerged in response to the increasingly
partisan and punitive nature of Israeli military law since the uprising."369
The deterioration in the Palestinian social fabric worsened after the
opening of the October 1991 peace talks. While there was initial euphoria in
some circles, many fundamentalists and others opposed to a negotiated
settlement with Israel stepped up their violence. As the peace talks dragged
on with no positive results, more Palestinians despaired. Internecine violence,
attacks on collaborators, and disobedience of UNLU directives all
increased.370 Hamas' popularity had dropped in the wake of optimism
surrounding the opening of the peace talks but was reinvigorated as the talks
stalled.371 The June 1992 election of Labor party leader Yitzhak Rabin to
replace hardliner Yitzhak Shamir had a similar impact. While some
Palestinians were optimistic about the prospects for autonomy, others were
365. Ya'ari, supra note 7, at 16.
366. The Shabab, supra note 364, at 10.
367. Ya'ari, supra note 7, at 16.
368. Andoni, supra note 332, at 57.
369. Roy, supra note 5, at 64.
370. For an analysis of Palestinian politics in the opening period of the peace talks see Ali Jarbawi
& Roger Heacock, Winds of War, Winds of Peace: The Palestinian Strategy Debate, MmDLE E. REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 12.
371. Jon Immanuel, Gaza: Local Needs or National Goals?, JERUSALEM PosT, Apr. 17, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file.
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skeptical or pessimistic. Some of those opposed to any negotiated settlement
with Israel or a settlement that fell short of statehood engaged in violent or
disruptive actions. 72
These fundamental changes have caused many Palestinians to reassess the
intifada itself.33 The public personalities and the PLO-backed negotiating
team have raised the possibility of accepting interim autonomy as proposed in
the peace talks, 31 noting that "albeit transitional, [interim autonomy would
provide] breathing space, a period of respite during which the Palestinians
might struggle to reconstruct the infrastructure of their own autonomous
society.""75 Those supporting this alternative questioned the continuance of
general strikes, which harm Palestinians more than Israelis.376 Thus, while
the general strike remains the primary symbol of the movement, the UNLU
is calling fewer of them.3" In April 1992, bayan No. 81 directed that only
one general strike be held each month. Furthermore, the UNLU permitted
shops to remain open until 3 pm instead of 1 pm, except in the Old City of
Jerusalem where shops could remain open until 5 pm. Leaflet No. 81 also
abolished localized general strikes to mark the deaths of martyrs by calling
instead for traffic to stay off the road for 15 minutes. This bayan also reduced
the boycott of Israeli goods, allowing shopkeepers to sell certain goods "for
which there is no national alternative. "378 In a period in which many
Palestinians challenge the legitimacy of the intifada itself, the uprising's
leadership faces a choice between adapting or relinquishing control. The
UNLU's decision to abate its calls for general strikes indicates a realization
that the strikes cause undue economic hardship not justified by their political
benefits, particularly in light of the diminished effectiveness of strikes in the
wake of the Gulf War.
The UNLU's crisis of legitimacy, characterized particularly by its inability
to enforce strikes and control collaborator killings, has created a vacuum of
sorts in which four groups have tried to assert authority. These groups are the
PLO, the public personalities, the UNLU, and the gangs. On the highest
level, the external PLO continues to have influence that exceeds that of the
372. Tom Masland et al., The Inner Intifada, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1992, at 32, 32-33.
373. Jon Immanuel, Palestinians Rethinking Intifada, supra note 343, at 2; The Intifada at the
Crossroads, supra note 337, at 9.
374. PALESTINE AFFAIRS CENTER INFORMATION PAPER SERIES No.1, PALESTINE INTERIM SELF-
GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS: EXPANDED OUTLINE OF THE CONCEPTS, PRELIMINARY MEASURES AND
ELEcTIoNS MODALITIES (1992) (explaining Palestinian delegation's position on interim self-government
arrangements).
375. RIOBY, supra note 9, at 16-17 (footnote omitted).
376. Id. at 16.
377. Azmy Bishara, Palestine in the New Order, MIDDLE E. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 2, 6.
378. Jon Immanuel, Arafat Has Chance to Impose Will, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 10, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file; Jon Immanuel, U.S. Blasted for Boycott of Libya, PLO
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other groups. Its power, however, is subject to considerable limitations; for
example, while PLO directives calling for an end to collaborator killings may
influence activists generally, the PLO is incapable of halting the activity on
a local level. On the next level are the public personalities, such as Faisal
Husseini, who appear to articulate both external PLO directives and popular
sentiments. Any conflicts between the PLO and the public personalities
apparently are synthesized privately so that the personalities appear to speak
in harmony with the PLO. The third level of authority, which enjoys a degree
of legitimacy parallel to that of the personalities, is the UNLU, which appears
to have retained its underground rotating character. As noted, however, the
population's reluctance to comply with the UNLU's edicts is a sign of its
diminished legitimacy. Moreover, bayanat that reflect inconsistencies and the
influence of various factions vying for control demonstrate the UNLU's
internal problems. Finally, in the post-Gulf era, the influence of gangs has
grown considerably. Possible participation in reviewing bayanat, in addition
to control over areas like the Nablus Qasbah, indicate that gangs have
achieved a tremendous level of power. These developments may indicate
either a permanent shift of authority to youth gangs or merely a passing
influence on intifada decision-making. In any event, the rise in the influence
of gangs and the corresponding diminution of UNLU's power indicate that the
intifada's embryonic legal decision-making process is currently in flux.
Leaflet No. 84 of July 1992 demonstrates this problem.379 It glorifies
stabbers, and condemns then newly-elected Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin. While all PLO factions generally proofread leaflets, this bayan appears
to take an uncharacteristically hardline stance by contradicting PLO Chairman
Arafat's positive assessment of Rabin. Its glorification of stabbing may
indicate that Fatah youth gangs proofread it, rather than PLO senior
officials."' Communiqu6 No. 84 thus indicates the failure of senior activists
to control the content of important bayanat and represents a significant
breakdown in the intifada's legal decision-making structure.
The Gulf War has thus had a deleterious effect on the embryonic legal
decision-making of the intifada. The lowest level of authority - gangs and
other violent elements - increased their coercive abilities and even their
legitimacy in some circles at the expense of three higher levels of authority -
the UNLU, the public personalities, and the PLO. Hamas also increased its
influence on the population in this time of economic and psychological
depression as more Palestinians turn to Islam's consolation in lieu of
diplomacy. Since Israel does not permit general elections in the Territories,
the popular legitimacy and support accorded to each group is unclear.
379. Ion Immanuel, UNL Leaflet No. 84 Attempts to Jwnpstart lntifada, JERUSALEM PoST, July
6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Intl file.
380. Id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule in the Occupied Territories has
striven to increase Palestinians' control over their own lives, both for the
short-term goals of weakening Israeli control and demonstrating the
Palestinian belief that Israeli rule is illegitimate, and for the longer-term goal
of setting the groundwork for more permanent institutions after eventual self-
rule. To help accomplish these goals, the movement in its early days created
underground institutions to perform many of the legal functions normally in
the hands of governments; these institutions, in turn, crafted substantive and
procedural rules to guide the lives of Palestinians. Both these institutions and
their rules draw upon elements of traditional culture. Palestinian legal culture
remains primarily based upon customary norms that evolved from the different
legal traditions in the region. Rather than disregarding customary law as
primitive or backward, the new Palestinian institutions have used those aspects
that can help restore social order. Thus, for example, the intifada institutions
have emphasized traditional family and community norms and the traditional
reliance on mediation and reconciliation rather than individual justice. This
utilization of selected aspects of past indigenous traditions has the advantage
of lending legitimacy to the new system.
Intifada decision-making has done more than reproduce traditional legal
structures, however. It has also made an effort to respond to changed
circumstances by selectively retaining or revitalizing aspects of Islamic law,
customary law, and Jordanian and Egyptian law, while augmenting them with
new institutions, rules, and procedures. Thus, the intifada has marked a
change in the characteristics of the leadership; leadership and decision-making
now involves younger individuals, people from middle or working class
backgrounds, and perhaps some women. This leadership has introduced new
rules, some of which, such as those on labor relations or women's issues such
as mahr, may represent not only a response to changed circumstances, but
even factors that will contribute to social change.
These new institutions, particularly the UNLU, and the rules they
promulgated enjoyed widespread legitimacy in the early period of the intifada.
Since the Gulf War, however, they have faced an escalating crisis of
legitimacy that threatens their continued growth, effectiveness, legitimacy, and
possibly even existence. The most fundamental of the factors contributing to
this crisis is the continuance of the Israeli occupation. As long as the
institutions have to operate underground, the costs of invisibility (such as the
denial of internationally-accepted trial rights in the name of protection) will
be high. In addition, the fact that participants in the UNLU are subject to
arrest and deportation makes continuity, consistency, institutional memory,
and the sharing of experience difficult, and has contributed to the growing
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strength of more youthful, and possibly more radical and violent, leadership.
Moreover, the fact that the UNLU has thus far failed to achieve its
overarching goal of independence contributes to popular dissatisfaction and a
loss of credibility. Finally, the Occupation contributes to this crisis of
legitimacy because the methods that would best enhance legitimacy, such as
a free and fair election, are unlikely to occur in the current political climate.
The disorganization and internal divisions that plague Palestinian decision-
makers, for reasons both within and beyond their control, is another factor in
this crisis. 81 As a result, the UNLU has had to contend with independent
action on the part of private individuals, Hamas and other political factions,
local committees, public personalities, and the external PLO. This multitude
of voices contributes to increased popular noncompliance with the rules set out
in UNLU bayanat; many Palestinians now refuse to strike on strike days,
attempt to enforce the h/ab on women, and continue to execute suspected
collaborators without paying any attention to the procedures propounded by
the UNLU.
This escalating violence is both a particularly visible sign of the UNLU's
loss of legitimacy and a particularly acute contributor to it. Frustration with
the continued occupation also contributes to the delegitimation of the UNLU,
as does the perception that the UNLU is not accomplishing much and that
other groups (such as Hamas) or methods (such as increasingly deadly
violence) may work better. Each escalation in the violence makes more people
realize that the UNLU is unable to control it, and further hurts the UNLU's
legitimacy. What makes this problem particularly acute is the fact that, absent
significant progress in the peace process, the occupation will almost certainly
continue to entail violence and coercion, emanating both from internecine
conflict amongst the Palestinians and from the Israeli occupation forces. Even
a grant of partial autonomy as a result of the talks might cause individuals
who want immediate independence to respond with even greater violence.
The PLO and UNLU must do what they can to respond to this crisis of
legitimacy. Palestinian decision-makers should create a centralized political
leadership for the Occupied Territories.382 This new authority must change
the current disorganized, undefined, and dysfunctional relationship between
local leaders and the external PLO, although this may be difficult given the
continued illegality of official contact. The new leadership must also increase
efforts to connect to grassroots groups; for example, the new leadership could
appoint people to play judicial roles in local communities. Alternatively, it
could arrange to have the local communities elect judges, thus strengthening
the judges' legitimacy in their jurisdictions. Greater ties to grassroots groups
381. Bishara, supra note 377, at 6.
382. Id.
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would increase the legitimacy of the central leadership. Moreover, having one
centralized political leadership would reduce or eliminate the number of
overlapping or conflicting signals the leadership sends to Palestinians.383
Such unanimity would contribute to the likelihood that most Palestinians will
perceive the leadership as legitimate, make it easier for those Palestinians to
know what they should or should not do, and make it easier to police and
enforce compliance among others. Unfortunately, however, the present
climate of despair, internecine violence, and diplomatic stalemate makes it
unlikely that much progress will be made until there is some kind of interim
settlement with the Israelis; preventing the situation from deteriorating further
may be the best that can be anticipated until then.
While enhancing the legitimacy of the UNLU will alleviate some of the
problems, a constitution or autonomy charter providing the principles for a
Palestinian legal system is essential to a more complete resolution. Palestin-
ians must draft this document on the basis of their own evaluation of the
efficacy and relevance of pre-existing legal traditions, new rules introduced
since the beginning of the intifada, and international standards. A
constitutional document imposed by other actors, such as Israelis, Jordanians,
Americans, or even the United Nations, will lack legitimacy and will not
increase rule of law in the Territories. The new legal system should include
rules, procedures, and institutions, including a law school"' and police
force. This article has discussed a number of issues that would pose
significant problems if the Territories obtain autonomy or independence,
including what to do with the complex legal regime developed during the
intifada. The new leaders would have to review systematically the Occupied
Territories' legal traditions and laws, including those innovations introduced
during the intifada. Some, such as Mandate and Israeli law, they might
abandon altogether.385 Others, such as elements of religious and customary
383. The creation of a permanent, centralized judicial body for the intifada would help
significantly. It would need to have a rotating group of members (since participation in intifada
institutions is illegal), but like the UNLU would develop its own character over time. Having such a
set judicial body would make it easier to establish that judgments from the center are binding on local
justice committees or mediators. Publication of its decisions in bayanat would clarify judicial rules and
procedures, thus facilitating compliance. Moreover, this approach would help counter the media's focus
on reports of violence, gangsterism, and hooliganism, and present Palestinians, Israelis, and others with
a view of a Palestinian leadership that can resolve disputes peacefully.
Two other steps would help achieve similar results. The UNLU should consider publishing a
criminal code, which would enable people to know in advance what they may and may not do, and help
address the human rights problems discussed above in connection with secret sentences. See supra notes
206-208 and accompanying text. Finally, some kind of Ministry of Justice could effectively coordinate
practice throughout the Territories, and issue rules clarifying procedures. This, again, would increase
predictability.
384. Such an institution would centralize learning and scholarship; moreover, faculty, students, and
practitioners could assist in the process of further legal drafting. A school might also help revitalize the
legal profession in the Territories.
385. The new leaders would have to decide whether Israeli law should apply to any remaining
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law, they probably would retain in light of the deeply entrenched nature of
these laws and their close connection with Palestinian culture and world-view.
The new leaders would have to address the problem that arises when these
earlier laws conflict with other possible goals or international standards, such
as equality for women."' 6 In addition, certain aspects of the intifada legal
processes might or should be abandoned, particularly those practices that
violate international standards of human rights. Finally, the new government
would need to consider simplifying whatever old rules are kept and publishing
them along with all new rules that it passes in a single collection.
Despite its many problems, the intifada has been an important attempt to
gain control over legal decision-making, an area which has often been in the
hands of outsiders. "The value of the intifada cannot be measured by its
ability to win independence in the shortest possible time."3"7 The develop-
ment of Palestinian embryonic self rule is a phenomenon of internal, regional,
and international significance. A greater comprehension of it can give us a
greater theoretical understanding of social process in general, and can help to
guarantee that other nations will be better able to deal with Palestine when and
if it takes its place among the states of the world. For these reasons, the
intifada's various aspects and ramifications present a fertile, and necessary,
field of academic inquiry.
Jewish settlers or whether they would be subject to Palestinian laws.
386. Customary and Islamic law, sexism, and a resurgence of fundamentalism make it very
difficult to address the restrictions on women. Any attempt to do so would no doubt require delicate
balancing. The total abandonment of all past practices would delegitimize any new laws on women's
rights, and certain sectors are sure to advocate a return to earlier customary and religious norms and
vehemently oppose changing the status quo. Nonetheless, a governing constitution should firmly assert
the equality of women, along the lines of the PNC Declaration of Independence. In addition, any
government should pursue the current proposals for reform of the family code and make revisions to
other statutes affecting the status of women so as to improve their position vis-4-vis men.
387. Bishara, supra note 377, at 6.

